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Euthanasia is a highly controversial and topical issue in South Africa at the moment. Following recent 
developments in common law, the need for euthanasia legislation in South Africa needs to be 
considered and further whether such legislation should allow for a mature minor to request euthanasia 
provided they are considered sufficiently mature to make such a decision.  The purpose of this 
dissertation is to show the need for implementation of euthanasia legislation which would also permit 
terminally ill mature minors to request euthanasia.  
This research will involve a rights-based analysis in order to show that a terminally ill mature minor 
can successfully rely on his or her Constitutional rights to dignity, bodily integrity, privacy, equality, 
healthcare and freedom to request active euthanasia. There is a duty on the state to protect and 
promote the rights of terminally ill minors and it can be shown that it does such a minor more harm 
than good to force him or her to suffer unbearable pain until their natural death occurs. 
Having shown that minors can rely on the rights above, this dissertation will conduct an investigation 
of a child’s right to autonomy and bodily integrity in order to show that to limit a child’s right to make 
decisions about his or her own body is an overextension of legal paternalism. In all matters 
concerning a child, the child’s best interests are always of paramount importance. The purpose of this 
research is to show that it cannot be in the child’s best interests to force a terminally ill child to 
continue to suffer until their natural death despite the child requesting otherwise.  
In the discussion of paediatric euthanasia, the concept of competence to make a decision will also be 
considered. It is essential that should a child be permitted to request euthanasia, that child must be 
sufficiently competent and mature to make the decision to die. Methods of assessing competency and 
maturity will be analysed in addition to existing legislation, such as the Children’s Act,1 which 
specifically provides instances in which a child can make a decision regarding their own body, 
showing an acknowledgement by the legislature of the need to promote and protect a child’s right to 
autonomy.    
The final section of this dissertation considers the foreign jurisdictions of Belgium and the 
Netherlands in order to critically assess how euthanasia legislation can be implemented with the 
inclusion of children. These are the only two jurisdictions worldwide which allow for a child to 
request euthanasia. The South African Law Commission’s report on euthanasia is also considered to 
contemplate the need for safeguards in respect of euthanasia that will ensure minimal abuse. 2 The 
                                                          
1 Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 





research is concluded by suggesting safeguards for implementation in legislation which permits 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction and background of the research problem 
 
Consider the following analogy. Olly is suffering from leukaemia and is in his final stages of life. The 
doctor tells him that he only has six months to live but Olly wishes his death would come sooner. He 
is suffering from unbearable pain every day and he can do nothing for himself without the help of his 
carer. He requires help to go to the toilet, bath, dress and eat and most days he is so weak that he 
cannot even get out of bed. The doctor keeps giving him medication to help with the pain but he is 
still suffering immeasurably. He has heard stories of people in similar positions who, towards the end 
of their lives, are so highly medicated that they cannot even recognise their family or loved ones and 
may slip away without even having the chance to properly say goodbye. Olly knows that he is not 
going to get any better. He is tired of waking up every day in pain with no hope of it abating and he 
wishes to end the life he now considers to be completely worthless and undignified. Olly is 17 years 
and 7 months old but is mature beyond his years. He is fully competent to refuse treatment yet he is 
unable to request active euthanasia.  Olly has considered committing suicide on a number of 
occasions but firstly, he cannot acquire the means to commit suicide and secondly, he does not wish 
his family to find his corpse after he has committed suicide in a horrific manner.  
If Olly is South African, he is unable to request active euthanasia where a doctor would act to bring 
about his death, for instance by means of a lethal injection, and must be forced to suffer until his 
natural death. It may, however, be possible for him to refuse any medical treatment although this is 
not explicitly stated in the Children’s Act.1  The Act merely provides that when a child is over the age 
of 12 and is sufficiently mature to understand the ‘benefits, risks, social and other implications of 
treatment’ then such a child can consent to treatment.2 Despite there being no explicit provision for 
refusal of treatment, it could possibly be argued that such a child can also refuse treatment even if the 
decision would result in death. However, this refusal is likely to be challenged and result in extended 
litigation, none of which Olly wants to have to face. If the legislation does allow for him to refuse 
medical treatment, this only means that he will still have to suffer until death, only perhaps the 
suffering will be shorter than waiting for natural death to occur.  
If Olly lived in Oregon, he would only be permitted to request physician assisted suicide, which 
would involve the acquisition of lethal medication which he would take to bring about death, if he 
                                                          
1 Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 





was 18 years old.3 Olly would have to suffer until he reaches the age of 18 at which point he would be 
able to end his own life in a dignified manner. Olly will not have matured vastly in 5 months time, at 
least not to the extent that he now is competent to make the decision to die where before the age of 18 
he was not. He will not magically attain competency at the stroke of midnight on his 18th birthday – If 
he is incompetent now, he will be incompetent then and vice versa. Olly fully understands the 
consequences of his request for death and he is as competent as an adult to make such a decision. 
If Olly is Belgian or Dutch he would be able to make use of the euthanasia law in his country. In such 
an instance he would be able to request death and, provided he is considered to be competent and 
mature to make the decision as assessed by professionals, he would be able to die with dignity. He 
would be able to say goodbye to his family properly before death. He would be able to have autonomy 
over his body and choose the moment of his death. If he were Belgian or Dutch, the law would respect 
that Olly, despite his age, also has the right to die if he understands the implications thereof. Olly’s 
rights would be respected and he would die a peaceful death instead of being forced to suffer until 
death.  
Unfortunately for Olly, he is South African. Olly has no option but to continue to suffer immeasurable 
pain until his natural death occurs. He has begged his doctor a number of times to end his life but his 
oncologist knows that if he helps Olly to die, he might be criminally prosecuted and he cannot afford 
to take the risk. Olly will continue to live what he considers to be a meaningless life. He will continue 
to suffer unbearable pain every day. He will live without dignity, he will die without dignity.  
The right to dignity is a cornerstone of our democracy and the Constitution is founded on the values 
of human dignity, equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.4 Fundamental to a 
person’s right to dignity and to freedom is to be able to make choices about one’s own body. This 
dissertation looks at whether the rights of terminally ill patients are unjustifiably infringed by 
prohibiting voluntary active euthanasia. If the right to die is constitutionally guaranteed, it must 
further be decided whether this right extends to terminally ill children as well. The aim of this 
dissertation is to show that if a child, like Olly, is suffering from a terminal illness and is sufficiently 
mature to make the decision to die, which is something that must be assessed in line with legislative 
safeguards, then such a mature minor should be given the right to make use of euthanasia.  
This research is particularly necessary in light of recent common law developments in the field. In the 
2015 case of Stransham-Ford,5 it was held that Mr Stransham-Ford who was suffering from stage 4 
terminal cancer was permitted to acquire the assistance of a physician to end his life and the physician 
                                                          
3 Oregon Death With Dignity Act 1997. 
4 s 1, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.  





would not be criminally prosecuted for helping. The applicant relied on his constitutional rights to 
dignity, freedom, bodily integrity and privacy and ultimately argued that he had a right to die and end 
his unbearable suffering. Following the abovementioned case which, at the time of writing, is being 
appealed in the Supreme Court of Appeal, the discussion on euthanasia has been re-opened. In 1998, 
the South African Law Commission published a report entitled ‘Euthanasia and the Artificial 
Preservation of Life’6 which included draft legislation that was never implemented. Following the 
court’s decision in Stransham-Ford, it is necessary to reconsider if legislation should be promulgated 
in this regard and if so, what the legislation should include.  
Of specific importance is consideration of whether children should be permitted to request death and 
make use of euthanasia. This dissertation will discuss whether a terminally ill child would be able to 
successfully rely on the rights afforded to them in terms of the Constitution, as was done by the 
applicant in the Stransham-Ford case7 or whether a minor would be prohibited from making use of 
the practice based on their age. This will require a discussion of a child’s right to autonomy and 
methods of assessing competence. It will be argued that provided a terminally ill child is assessed and 
declared to be competent and mature to make the decision to die, such a child should be permitted to 
make use of euthanasia. As in any matter concerning a child, the best interests of the child will also be 
considered in respect of the decision to die with the aim being to show that it is not in the child’s best 
interests to force him or her to continue to suffer unbearable pain if they have requested death and are 
sufficiently competent to make such a decision.8 
In addition to considering the need for euthanasia legislation, this dissertation will also attempt, with 
the help of foreign law analysis, to contemplate what safeguards should be included in legislation in 
order to ensure minimal abuse. This discussion is especially important in respect of terminally ill 
children, should they be included in legislation as recommended.  
1.2 Outline of the topic  
 
Euthanasia is defined as the practice of ‘bringing about death in a manner that causes the least amount 
of suffering to the patient.’9 Many patients who are diagnosed as terminally ill frequently spend their 
last few months in unbearable pain and on a regime of pain medication which often makes them 
                                                          
6 South African Law Commission Issue Project 86 Euthanasia and the Artificial Preservation of Life (1998). 
7 Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others 2015 (4) SA 4 (GP). 
8 S 28(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that in all matters affecting a child, 
the best interests of the child are always of paramount importance.  





unaware of their surroundings or the presence of their loved ones. In such an instance, the question 
arises, should terminally ill patients be permitted to end their life with the assistance of a medical 
practitioner in order to terminate their suffering? This dissertation will extend the question further to 
children and will question whether, or in what circumstances, a child would be able to request 
euthanasia. The Constitution is founded on the values of human dignity and the advancement of 
human rights and freedoms. 10 In light of this, it is necessary to consider whether legislation is 
necessary in regard to euthanasia in order to give effect to the rights enshrined in the Constitution.  
There are currently only two jurisdictions that allow terminally ill children to request euthanasia 
although there are a number of other jurisdictions which allow for adults to request euthanasia or to 
acquire assistance to die.11 In Belgium there is no age limit in terms of the legislation and in the 
Netherlands, a child must be over the age of 12 to be able to request euthanasia. This dissertation 
looks specifically at children’s rights in relation to euthanasia and whether the current South African 
law pertaining to children would allow for children to request euthanasia and further, what legislation, 
if any at all, should be promulgated in order to allow for children to make end-of-life decisions and/or 
to provide safeguards in respect of the practice.  
Death is a certainty for everyone and many people fear that they will suffer at the end of their life. 
Terminally ill patients can obtain palliative care but such care can only go so far in easing suffering.  
In South Africa, many poor people are unable to access palliative care at all. Furthermore, health care 
institutions are very often under resourced which means that resources are more readily allocated to 
those patients who are not terminally ill. In many instances this means that a patient suffering from a 
terminal illness is not even afforded the opportunity of going on a pain management regime and 
suffers incredibly until his or her natural death.  In such an instance, it is submitted that a patient 
should be given the opportunity to request euthanasia instead of being forced to suffer until death and 
the need for legislation in this regard needs to be considered. Euthanasia has historically been a 
controversial issue because of the moral implications associated with consenting to one’s own death 
and religious arguments against it. In respect of children, the issue becomes even more complex and 
controversial.  
However, it is ultimately the duty of the courts and indeed the Legislature when legislating, to uphold 
and protect the rights enshrined in the Constitution. It is argued that the prohibition on voluntary 
active euthanasia is a violation of a patient’s right to dignity (s 10) and their right to freedom and 
security of the person (s12), specifically s 12(1)(e): the right not to be treated or punished in a cruel, 
                                                          
10 S 1: Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
11 Jurisdictions that have legislation allowing for voluntary active euthanasia include Switzerland, Luxemburg, 
Oregon, Washington and Vermont among others. In these jurisdictions, however, a person must legally be an 





inhuman or degrading way and s 12(2)(b): the right to security in and control over their body. Perhaps 
most importantly, the Constitution promotes the right to freedom of choice. Just as in life everyone 
has freedom of choice, so should everyone have the right to make their own end of life choices. It 
appears anomalous that people have the right to refuse medical treatment, the result of which is death, 
yet common law does not allow voluntary active euthanasia. 
To allow children to consent to their own death is very controversial and requires further 
consideration. However, our Constitution provides for equality before the law (s 9) and that nobody 
can be discriminated against on any of the listed grounds. If our Constitution would allow for adults to 
request euthanasia, then would this extend to children as well? Would it constitute a violation of 
children’s right to autonomy if only adults were allowed the right to make end of life decisions? This 
involves a delicate balancing act between the need to protect children, being vulnerable groups, with 
their rights as human beings. The discussion on paediatric euthanasia may be an uncomfortable one to 
have but it is one which needs consideration in light of recent common law development in the field.12 
One of the main arguments in favour of prohibiting euthanasia is that palliative care can go 
sufficiently far in relieving pain and suffering. However, palliative care is unable to relieve all pain 
and suffering and overlooks a patient’s loss of dignity and independence. This topic is of significant 
importance in a South African context because of the lack of palliative care available to people in the 
country and also the high rate of poverty. Many South Africans cannot afford palliative care and lack 
of health care resources mean that state institutions have to allocate resources selectively. A patient 
who is suffering from a terminal illness is less likely to receive care over a patient who has a prospect 
of survival.13 
Children have the right to self determination and autonomy and this dissertation will look at whether 
it is justifiable to limit the fundamental right to autonomy in respect of children making end of life 
decisions. S 129 of the Children’s Act provides that a child may consent to medical treatment if 
he/she is over the age of 12 and has sufficient maturity and mental capacity to understand the benefits, 
risks and social implications of it. Such a child may also consent to a medical operation if duly 
assisted by his/her parent or guardian. This means that such a child could theoretically also refuse 
medical treatment. It can be argued that after assessing a child’s maturity and ascertaining that the 
child can understand the consequences of their choice sufficiently, such a child who is suffering from 
a terminal illness should be given the option of euthanasia. A girl child of any age is permitted to 
                                                          
12 See the case of Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others 2015 (4) SA 4 
(GP). 
13 See Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) where the court held that the 
state’s obligations to provide health care are only to the extent that they have available resources. It is necessary 





request an abortion in terms of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act. It therefore seems that in 
respect of issues pertaining to a child’s bodily integrity, the law allows for a child to exercise their 
autonomy and make their own decisions. Why should it be any different in respect of the choice to 
die? Failing to acknowledge a minor’s autonomy in the circumstances of a terminal illness does more 
harm than good to that minor. Instead of protecting the minor, it is condemning a child to a life of 
unbearable pain and suffering which they have no choice but to endure.  
 
1.3 Definitions 
1.3.1 Euthanasia  
Euthanasia is a term that encompasses different forms of aid in dying. Active euthanasia is a “positive 
act which is intended to kill” whereas passive euthanasia is “an omission to act which, equally 
intentionally, allows the patient’s death to occur.” 14 Ethically speaking, it is argued that as both forms 
of euthanasia have the same outcome, they are no different morally. Passive euthanasia is often 
carried out, where for instance, a patient is in a vegetative state and the machines keeping that patient 
alive are switched off. This is not an unlawful act as it is argued that it is the disease which is the 
cause of death in such an instance rather than the act of the machines being switched off. However, 
giving a terminally ill patient lethal medication that will result in their death is an unlawful act on the 
part of the doctor as this is active euthanasia. Even if the patient asks to die and the doctor is merely 
carrying out the patient’s request, this is still an unlawful act. This dissertation considers voluntary 
active euthanasia which is an act of the doctor which brings about a patient’s death, at the request of 
the patient.  
1.3.2 Physician assisted suicide 
This is a form of aid in dying where a doctor administers or supplies a patient with lethal medication 
that will bring about the patient’s death.15 It makes no difference whether the doctor prescribes lethal 
medication for the patient knowing that the patient will ingest the medication which will result in 
death or whether the doctor administers the lethal medication to the patient himself, the legal 
consequences are the same.16 In both instances, the physician will be criminally liable for bringing 
about the death of the patient. This will be considered in further detail in the following chapter.  
                                                          
14 J Rachels, J ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia’ (1975) 292(2) New England Journal of Medicine 78 -80. 
15 D J McQuoid-Mason ‘Doctor-assisted suicide: What is the present legal position in South Africa?’ (2015) 






1.4 Limitations of the research 
 
It is common for people to formulate what is known as a ‘living will’ when they are still in a 
competent state of mind. This document states that a person does not want to be kept alive artificially 
and that should they land up in a position where they are solely dependent on machines to survive, 
they wish these machines to be switched off so that death will naturally occur. People also issue 
advance directives on what medical treatment they would not like to receive. Advance directives are, 
however, not legally binding although it is often used as a guide by medical practitioners in making 
decisions relating to treatment. A discussion of advance directives, their application and whether 
legislation should include provisions relating to advance directives fall outside the scope of this 
dissertation. 
This dissertation will also not discuss involuntary euthanasia and will be limited to cases where a 
patient is mentally competent to make an end of life decision, regardless of their age. This discussion 
of euthanasia is further limited to patients suffering from a terminal disease or illnes that is of a 
physical nature only and will not consider non-physical ailments.  
1.5 Research goals 
 
One of the primary goals of the research is to show that prohibiting voluntary active euthanasia for a 
child who is terminally ill and sufficiently competent and mature to make the decision to die, does 
that child more harm than good and is not in the child’s best interests. In arriving at the above 
conclusion, the research will consider the Constitutional rights to dignity, bodily integrity, privacy, 
healthcare and equality and their unjustifiable infringement through the prohibition of voluntary 
active euthanasia for the terminally ill, considering the rights as they relate to children in particular.  
An attempt will also be made to consider how competence and maturity of a child could be assessed 
in order to show that a mature minor who is assessed to be competent to make the decision to die 
should in fact be given the opportunity to request euthanasia. In addition, the right to autonomy will 
be considered in the context of a mature minor suffering from a terminal disease in order to show that 
it is an overextension of legal paternalism and in fact not in a child’s best interests to disallow a 
mature minor to request death.17  
                                                          
17 S 28 of the Constitution provides that in all matters affecting the child, the best interests of the child are of 





The final aim of the research is to consider the current legal position in South Africa and to decide 
how the law can be amended in order to allow for euthanasia to take place. Comparisons with foreign 
jurisdictions will be considered in order to pave the way forward. Considering the legislation 
proposed by the South African Law Commission, this research aims to show that such legislation falls 
short to the extent that it does not provide that a mature minor may request euthanasia. Additional 
safeguards in respect of minors requesting euthanasia will be considered, drawing on the law in 
foreign jurisdictions, in order to ensure that abuse of the practice is minimal. 
1.6 Research methodology 
 
This dissertation will not be based on empirical research. Instead, it will involve critical analyses of 
existing law on the subject including existing legal principles, case law, legislation and general 
discussion of the topic both in a South African context and in foreign jurisdictions.  
Initially, this dissertation will involve a descriptive approach to explain the law in respect of 
euthanasia as it currently stands in South Africa. This will also involve a critical analysis of court 
cases heard in South Africa on the issue of euthanasia, assessing the decisions of the court critically.  
Secondly, a rights-based analysis will be conducted in respect of the issue at hand in order to decide 
what rights are in play and further whether there is an unjustifiable infringement of these rights by 
prohibiting terminally ill children from requesting euthanasia. This involves an analysis of whether 
the right to die is constitutionally guaranteed and further whether this right extends to children as well. 
This Constitutional approach means a discussion and analysis of the rights in terms of the 
Constitution, how far they extend and how they apply to terminally ill children in particular. 
Bioethical principles, including those and other rights specified in international frameworks, will be 
considered in this rights-based analysis.  
The penultimate stage will consider and contrast the law in the international jurisdictions of Belgium 
and the Netherlands. The euthanasia legislation in these jurisdictions will be considered in order to 
ascertain the extent to which such legislation promotes and protects the rights of terminally ill minors. 
An analysis in this regard is helpful in order to establish if similar legislation should be promulgated 
in South Africa. In this stage of the enquiry, an analysis of the South African Law Commission report 
on euthanasia and the draft legislation will also be critically considered.  
After having conducted the rights-based analysis and having considered the legislation in foreign 
jurisdictions in respect of pediatric euthanasia, recommendations will be made in respect of how the 





1.7 Structure of the dissertation 
 
The next chapter will examine the different forms of euthanasia and how, at common law level, 
euthanasia is considered to be a crime. This will involve a discussion of the artificial difference 
between passive and active euthanasia. Following this, the elements of the crime of murder will be 
considered in respect of euthanasia and assisted suicide in order to critically assess the current law in 
South Africa which prohibits the practice. This will also involve discussion of literature on the matter 
in order to reflect on whether the elements of the crime of murder are legitimately fulfilled when a 
doctor euthanizes a patient. In considering the defense of consent to death, popular arguments against 
euthanasia, and their validity, will also be contemplated. The final part of the chapter will consider the 
history of euthanasia and assisted suicide at common law level in South Africa and an analysis of the 
existing case law will be conducted.  
Chapter three (3) will involve a rights-based analysis of the practice of euthanasia. At the outset, the 
bioethical principles protecting human rights and their relation to the matter at hand will be assessed, 
making reference to the existing legal frameworks and ethical principles relevant in this matter. Prior 
to an in-depth analysis of each right involved, the chapter will make reference to where children’s 
rights fit in a constitutional context, drawing on theories of rights relevant to children. Following this, 
a critical analysis of the right to dignity, life, bodily integrity, privacy, equality and healthcare will be 
conducted to show that by prohibiting voluntary active euthanasia for mature minors, these rights are 
being unjustifiably infringed.  
Chapter four (4) will consider children’s decision making capacity in particular. This will involve an 
examination of the existing legislation relating to a child’s right to make a decision with regards to 
their own body. Drawing on the rights-based analysis in chapter 3, the chapter will consider how far 
the right to autonomy extends in relation to children. Further, the concept of competence in the sense 
of decision making will be expanded in order to determine if and how a child’s capacity for decision 
making can be assessed, especially in respect of the decision to die. The chapter will conclude by 
expanding the ‘best interests of the child’ concept in order to show that it cannot be in the best 
interests of a terminally ill mature minor to force him or her to suffer until his or her natural death.  
Having established that a mature minor’s rights in terms of the Constitution may be unjustifiably 
infringed by prohibiting voluntary active euthanasia and that provided decision making capacity and 
maturity are accurately assessed to determine competence to make the decision to die, chapter five (5) 
will explore the euthanasia legislation in Belgium and the Netherlands in relation to pediatric 





and the criticisms thereof. The chapter will also discuss the draft bill produced by the South African 
Law Commission which proposes South African legislation on the matter.  
Finally chapter six (6) will seek to conclude the discussion on voluntary active euthanasia for mature 
minors by summarizing the arguments, legal principles, common law and legislation previously 
discussed. This chapter also contains recommendations in respect of how South African law can, and 








In South Africa, there is currently no legislation regulating the practice of euthanasia and so in terms 
of common law, it is considered a crime. Anyone who assists another to end their own life is guilty of 
murder. This is even the case if the person whose life is ended is terminally ill and requests assistance 
in death. Euthanasia and assisted suicide, or any other form of aid in dying, is not permissible in terms 
of South African criminal law. Murder is defined as the unlawful and intentional causing of the death 
of another human being. 1 The act of a doctor, or anyone else, assisting a terminally ill patient to die 
can be seen as an intentional act to cause the death of a human being. It is also an unlawful act and so 
if any person, adult or minor, is assisted by another to die, that person who provides assistance, even 
if it is done for compassionate reasons, will be guilty of the crime of murder.  The case law,2 however, 
tends to indicate that the courts seem reluctant to punish a person who assists another to die where it is 
seen as a compassionate act or ‘mercy killing,’ particularly in cases where the patient is terminally ill.  
 
2.2 Active and Passive euthanasia  
 
Active euthanasia is ‘a positive act intended to kill’3 where a doctor directly causes the death of a 
patient by, for instance, administering a lethal injection. Passive euthanasia, on the other hand, 
involved what is seen as an omission to act on the part of the doctor in that the doctor will, for 
instance, remove life sustaining machinery or cease treatment on the patient which ‘intentionally 
allows the patient’s death to occur.’4 It is generally considered to be acceptable that passive euthanasia 
is permissible if it is in the interests of the patient that treatment of the patient be ceased.5 
                                                          
1 C R Snyman Criminal Law 6 ed (2014) 437. 
2 See the cases of S v De Bellocq (1975) 1 All SA 6 (T); S v Hartmann 1975 All SA 87 (C); S v Marengo (1991) 3 
All SA 784 (W) and S v Smorenburg 1992 (2) SACR 389 (C) where the court handed down suspended sentences 
and showed a lenient approach to euthanasia. 
3 M Stauch et al Text, Cases & Materials on Medical Law 3 ed (2006) 642. 
4 Ibid. 





It is often regarded as morally reprehensible for a person to kill another, even if it is considered to be 
‘mercy killing’ although letting someone die is often considered not to be morally wrong. 6 The 
rationale behind permitting passive euthanasia, such as ceasing or withholding treatment, is that the 
patient will die anyway and the doctor is merely ensuring that they do not suffer for longer than is 
necessary.7 The patient will, however, still continue to suffer after the doctor has ceased the treatment. 
In a case where, for instance, a patient has a breathing tube which is removed to cause death, the 
patient will suffocate to death which is incredibly frightening.8 Essentially, it could then be argued 
that in such an instance, active euthanasia is preferable because then suffering is ended 
instantaneously instead of a patient having to continue to suffer for days or even weeks following the 
cessation of treatment.9 To argue that passive euthanasia is ethically better is not in line with 
humanitarian principles because it is advocating that an individual suffer unnecessarily when such 
suffering could be ended immediately through active euthanasia.10  
Ethically speaking, it is argued that as both forms of euthanasia have the same outcome, they are no 
different morally. The Smith/Jones scenario11 proffered by James Rachels is the most commonly used 
philosophical means of describing how both an act and omission can be reprehensible.  The thought 
experiment is as follows: Both Smith and Jones stand to gain from the death of their six year old 
cousin. Smith sneaks into the bathroom one night when his cousin is bathing and secretly drowns him. 
Jones walks into the bathroom with the intention of drowning his cousin only to find that his cousin 
has slipped, hit his head and is drowning. Jones does nothing to help the child and watches as he 
drowns. In both cases, nobody knows who is responsible for the death and both Smith and Jones 
receive their inheritance. This thought experiment is used to show that if an act and omission have the 
same outcome and there was intention to cause that outcome in both cases, there is really no moral 
difference between the two actions. 
In considering the actions of Jones, it would be absurd to say that his omission is morally less 
reprehensible to that of Smith merely because he did not actually act despite the fact that he had the 
same motive as Smith and the outcome of both actions was the same. This thought experiment can be 
applied in respect of euthanasia in that it shows that morally there is no difference between killing and 
                                                          
6 P Singer Applied Ethics (1986) 171. 
7 J Rachels ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia’ (1975) 292(2) New England Journal of Medicine 78. 
8 R Ogden ‘The Right to Die: A Policy Proposal for Euthanasia and Aid in Dying’ (1994) 20(1) Canadian 
Public Policy/Analyse de Politiques 3. 
9 J Rachels (note 7 above; 78). 
10 Ibid. 





letting die.12 Whether a doctor removes life sustaining machines from a terminally ill patient or injects 
such a patient with a lethal injection to cause death, the doctor is still in the same moral position and it 
is immaterial how the outcome is achieved.13 
Many people perceive killing to be more morally reprehensible than ‘letting die’ merely because 
when someone kills another it is often with a reprehensible motive and the murders portrayed in the 
media are often gruesome and definitely immoral.14 ‘Letting die’ on the other hand is often perceived 
as being for compassionate reasons and is therefore considered not to be morally reprehensible.15 
These are ill conceived perceptions because they have more to do with motive than with the act or 
omission in question. If killing is done with a morally reprehensible motive, then it is ethically wrong 
just as an omission can in certain circumstances also be unethical.  
To argue that in the case of passive euthanasia the doctor is ‘doing nothing’ whereas in active 
euthanasia it is his act that causes death and he is therefore more morally culpable is a logically 
unsound argument because in criminal law one can be culpable for both acts and omissions. A doctor 
that, for instance, ceases treatment is performing an act; he is actively removing life sustaining 
machines or is no longer treating the patient.16 Each case should be considered separately because, as 
argued above, passive euthanasia may also be morally impermissible where, for instance, a doctor can 
easily treat a patient but does not and instead leaves the patient to die.17 Similarly, the act of a doctor 
performing active euthanasia on a patient where there is a prospect of that patient recovering is also 
morally reprehensible. Following from the above arguments, it is submitted that morally, ethically and 
legally active and passive euthanasia are no different and that if passive euthanasia is permissible, 




                                                          
12 J Rachels (note 7 above; 79).  
13 Ibid.  








2.3 Ethical perspective on active euthanasia  
 
HPCSA Guidelines for the Withholding and Withdrawal of Treatment18 which are in line with the 
World Medical Association (WMA) Declaration of Venice on Terminal Illness,19 stipulate that active 
euthanasia is both unlawful and is in opposition to the ethics of healthcare that should be adopted by 
all medical practitioners. The guidelines do, however, provide that a physician may alleviate pain and 
suffering by withholding treatment from a patient in order to allow that patient to die from natural 
causes at a quicker rate, and a doctor may also administer palliative care which may have the double 
effect of hastening death. By implication, the guidelines permit a doctor performing passive 
euthanasia provided that they are withholding or withdrawing treatment in order to alleviate pain and 
suffering.20 Active euthanasia is categorically prohibited. This distinction appears to be anomalous 
given that the reason stated for permitting passive euthanasia is to alleviate pain and suffering. Passive 
euthanasia means that treatment may be withdrawn but it does not end suffering immediately and the 
patient may still continue to suffer until death. If there is a real commitment on the part of physicians 
to alleviate pain and suffering, then active euthanasia should be permissible in order to allow for pain 
to be ended instantaneously. 
The WMA Resolution on Euthanasia21 states much of what is provided for in the Declaration on 
Terminal Illness,22although it does not categorically appear to refer to either active or passive 
euthanasia, provides that doctor-assisted suicide and euthanasia are contrary to medical ethical 
principles. 23 The WMA Declaration on Terminal Illness provides, however, that it is a medial 
practitioner’s duty to act in the best interests of the patient and to relieve pain and suffering. It can be 
argued that euthanasia or assisted suicide is in the best interests of a patient and aimed at relieving 
                                                          
18 Health Professions Council of South Africa Guidelines on Ethical Rules, Booklet 12: Guidelines for the 
Withholding and Withdrawing of Treatment (2008) available at http://www.hpcsa.co.za/conduct/Ethics 
accessed on April 14 2016.  
19 World Medical Association Declaration of Venice on Terminal Illness (2006) available at 
http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/i2/ accessed on 15 August 2016. 
20D J McQuoid-Mason ‘Stransham-Ford v. Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others: Can active 
voluntary euthanasia and doctor-assisted suicide be legally justified and are they consistent with the 
biomedical ethical principles? Some suggested guidelines for doctors to consider’ (2015) 8(2) SAJBL 38. 
21 World Medical Association Resolution on Euthanasia (2002) available at 
www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/e13b/ accessed on 15 August 2016. 
22 World Medical Association Declaration of Venice on Terminal Illness (note 19 above). 





pain and suffering24 making it the duty of the medical practitioner to respect the choice of a patient in 
this regard. The WMA Declaration on Euthanasia25 does, however, draw a distinction between active 
and passive euthanasia and provides that it is not permissible for a doctor to intentionally end the life 
of a patient, even if that patient consents to death but a doctor may withhold or withdraw treatment 
from a patient who wishes to let nature take its course if they are terminally ill.26 The Hippocratic 
Oath, which all medics are bound by and have a duty to obey also states that a medical practitioner 
must “neither prescribe nor administer a lethal dose of medicine to any patient even if asked.”27 
The World Medical Association Resolution on Euthanasia28 provides that the practice of euthanasia is 
in opposition to medical ethical principles and should not be carried out by medical professionals. 
Despite these provisions of the Resolution, however, the Constitution is supreme law in South Africa 
so if it can be shown (as was done in the Stransham-Ford29 case) that a person’s rights are being 
unjustifiably limited by disallowing euthanasia, then a doctor should be permitted to respect a 
patient’s autonomy and assist a patient to die if such a request is legal.30 Ultimately, the ethical 
principles of a profession must yield to the Constitution and such principles should not be adhered to 
if they are shown to unjustifiably limit the rights as enshrined in the Constitution.31 
 
2.4.Assisted suicide and euthanasia  
 
The phrase ‘assisted suicide’ is used to define situations where a person receives help from another 
person to commit suicide. For the purposes of this dissertation, it is necessary to consider the legal 
position in respect of assistance given by a doctor to a terminally ill patient to end their life as this is 
essentially what influences legislation. However, the decisions of the court in regard to assisted 
suicide, even where it is not a doctor who provides assistance, is of importance because it sheds light 
                                                          
24 K Moodley ‘The Fabricius decision on the Stransham-Ford case – an enlightened step in the right direction’ 
(2015) 105(6) SAMJ 434. 
25 World Medical Association Resolution on Euthanasia (note 21 above). 
26 D J McQuoid-Mason (note 20 above; 38). 
27See G van der Walt and E K Du Plessis ‘”I don’t know how I want to go but I do know that I want to be the 
one who decides” – The right to die – The High Court of South Africa rules’ (2015) 36(3) Obiter 813. 
28 World Medical Association Resolution on Euthanasia (note 21 above). 
29Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 2015 (4) SA 50 (GP). 
30 D J McQuoid-Mason (note 20 above; 39). 





on the current legal position in respect of this matter. The case law in this regard tends to indicate that 
where the deceased causes their own death by, for instance, ingesting lethal medication, their action is 
seen as a novus actus interveniens which breaks the causal chain of events and even if another person 
assisted them in acquiring the means to commit suicide, that person will not be guilty of murder. If 
this reasoning is followed, it can be argued that in a case of physician assisted suicide, the doctor 
would not be liable because it is the final action of the patient ingesting the medication that causes 
their own death.  
This differs from euthanasia in that it is the act of the doctor specifically (or another such person) that 
is the final act which causes the death of someone. In physician assisted suicide, the physician is 
considered merely to be a facilitator, whereas the role of the doctor in respect of euthanasia is 
active.32A common example is where, for instance, a doctor administers a lethal injection to a 
terminally ill patient in order to end their suffering. Despite this being considered an act of mercy and 
is in fact often referred to as “mercy killing,” it is still regarded as murder in terms of criminal law. 
 
2.5 Considering the elements of the crime of murder in respect of euthanasia and 
assisted suicide 
2.5.1 Intention 
In a case of passive euthanasia, the ‘eventual’ intention of the physician is to hasten death of the 
patient as they foresee that by removing life sustaining treatment, the patient will die. ‘Eventual’ 
intention is intention in the form of dolus eventualis. It can be argued that even the risk of eventuality 
is sufficient for intention in the form of dolus eventualis. This is because they subjectively foresee that 
by withdrawing or withholding treatment or by providing a patient with certain palliative care, it will 
hasten the death of the patient. Active euthanasia means only that the doctor has ‘actual’ intention to 
cause death by providing the patient with lethal medication.33 In both cases, the physician has some 
form of intention to cause death and it can be argued that if the type of intention for passive 
euthanasia is permissible, then active euthanasia should also be permissible. 
It is important to note that motive plays no role in deciding whether a perpetrator has intention or not. 
In a case of euthanasia, even if the person who assists another to die does so out of mercy and has 
                                                          
32 A Dhai ‘Physician-assisted dying and palliative care: Understanding the two’ (2015) 8(2) SAJBL 2. 
33 D J McQuoid-Mason ‘Doctor-assisted suicide: What is the present legal position in South Africa?’ (2015) 
105(7) SAMJ 527; also see D J McQuoid-Mason ‘Withholding or withdrawing treatment and palliative 






good motives, they will still be seen to have intention and will be held criminally liable. Motive only 
plays a role in sentencing, as one who has a good motive is likely to receive a lighter sentence.34 
However, in the case of a doctor assisting a patient to die, the professional consequences are generally 
no lesser even if the physician had a good motive.35 In certain instances, a bad motive may make what 
was originally a lawful act, unlawful. This would be, for example, where a person removes another 
from life sustaining treatment (ie ‘passive’ euthanasia) merely because they will inherit a large sum on 
the death of the patient.36 It has to be decided on a case by case basis whether or not the act of 
removing or withdrawing treatment is unlawful or not, taking into account whether the motive behind 
the omission is to alleviate pain and suffering or not.37 
Intention should also be considered in respect of the difference between doctor-assisted suicide and 
doctor-assisted death (or commonly referred to merely as euthanasia). In a case of physician assisted 
suicide, the doctor prescribes lethal medication which the patient is then responsible for taking and 
which causes their death. In such a case, the patient may be considered to be the cause of death and 
the doctor would then not be liable, although case law on the subject, as discussed below, shows that 
the court takes different approaches based on the circumstances of the particular case. It is argued in 
terms of South African law that even in a case of physician assisted suicide, the doctor can foresee 
that the patient will take the medication prescribed and that it will result in the patient’s death. This is 
intention in the form of dolus eventualis38 and the doctor can still be held liable.  
For doctor assisted death, or euthanasia, the intention of the doctor is seen as direct intention (dolus 
directus) in that the doctor directs his will to the harm – He administers a lethal injection or gives the 
patient medication which immediately causes the patient’s death. The intention element of the crime 
is fulfilled in the sense that there is dolus directus. The doctor in such a case has taken the patient’s 
life, and not the patient him/herself as in the case of suicide, and it is this that makes the doctor liable 
in South African law, even if the patient consented to his own death. Currently, consent to death is not 
regarded as a defence to unlawfulness.  
                                                          
34 See S v De Bellocq 1975 1 All SA 6 (T); S v Hartmann 3 1975 All SA 87 (C); S v Marengo 1991 3 All SA 784 
(W); S v Smorenburg 1992 (2) SACR 389 (C); J Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 5 ed (2016) 353-355. 
35 In the case of S v Hartmann 3 1975 All SA 87 (C), even though the doctor’s primary motive was to relieve his 
father’s pain and suffering, this did not mean that he could escape disciplinary action from the Health 
Professions Council.  
36 D J McQuoid-Mason (note 20 above; 37). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Dolus eventualis is defined as follows: ‘A person acts with intention in the form of dolus eventualis if the 
commission of the unlawful act or the causing of the unlawful result is not his main aim, but: 
(a) He subjectively foresees the possibility that, in striving towards his main aim, the unlawful act may be 
committed or the unlawful result may be caused, and 






In order for a person to be guilty of the crime of murder, the person must be both the factual and legal 
cause of the death.  In determining whether a person is the factual cause of death, the condition sine 
qua non test is applied: ‘but for’ the actions of the accused, the death would not have occurred.39 In 
respect of both voluntary active euthanasia and physician assisted suicide, the doctor is considered to 
be the factual cause of death. It is argued with physician assisted suicide that ‘but for’ the doctor 
prescribing the lethal medication to the patient, the patient would not have been able to take the 
medication and would not have died. In the case of voluntary active euthanasia where, for instance, 
the doctor gives the terminally ill patient a lethal injection, the doctor is obviously regarded as the 
factual cause of death.  
In turning to the legal cause of death, it is necessary to consider whether there is a new intervening act 
(novus actus interveniens) which breaks the causal chain of events between the act and the death.40 In 
respect of physician assisted suicide, it is often argued that the patient breaks the causal chain of 
events by ingesting the medication which results in their death and it is therefore the act of the patient 
that ultimately causes death.  In the states in the USA41 that allow for physician assisted suicide, 
voluntary active euthanasia where the doctor for instance injects the patient to cause death, is not 
permissible because in such a case the doctor is considered to be the direct cause of death and not the 
patient and therefore in such a case the doctor is criminally liable.  
Passive euthanasia is permissible in South African law because in respect of the causation element of 
the crime of murder, the disease or illness is seen as the cause of death and not the act of the doctor 
removing the life sustaining treatment. By the doctor removing the treatment or life sustaining 
machinery, it is seen merely as an omission and then the disease is what results in the death of the 
patient. However, the act of the doctor removing the treatment could also be seen as a positive act and 
if he did not do that, the patient would still be living. Where a doctor gives the patient lethal 
medication or removes a ventilator to cause death, it is still his positive act which causes the death of 
the patient. 42 It could further be argued that it is the act of the doctor removing the life sustaining 
machinery that causes the death of the patient and not the disease. Ultimately, the intention of the 
doctor is to hasten the death of a patient in order to protect their Constitutional rights to dignity and 
                                                          
39 See C R Snyman (note 1 above; 81-83). 
40 See C R Snyman (note 1 above; 86-87). 
41 The states of Oregon, Montana, Washington, Vermont and California permit physician assisted suicide.  
42 D J McQuoid-Mason ‘Doctor-assisted suicide: What is the present legal position in South Africa?’ (2015) 





quality of life and whether this is done through active or passive euthanasia should be irrelevant.43 If 
the argument is legitimate that the distinction made between active and passive euthanasia is an 
artificial one and passive euthanasia is permissible in terms of our law, then active euthanasia should 
also be permissible. It was argued that if it is established that there is a duty on a doctor to withdraw 
treatment (ie an omission) from a terminally ill patient in order to protect their dignity, then that duty 
exists through an act of euthanasia as opposed to an omission.44 
What should also be noted in the discussion of causation is the ‘doctrine of double effect’ in respect of 
palliative care. This principle is that a doctor may provide a patient with palliative care which relieves 
pain and suffering but at the same time hastens death.45 In such a case, it is the administration of the 
medication which hastens death even though administering such medication is not considered to be 
unlawful.46 In such a case, even though it is ultimately the medication administered to the patient 
which hastens the death of the patient from the underlying disease or condition from which they are 
suffering, the administration of such palliative care is considered to be lawful and a physician will not 
be held liable for the patient’s death.47 
 
2.5.3 Consent as a defence for unlawfulness 
One of the defences to criminal liability is consent. Consent will exclude unlawfulness if 3 
requirements are met: (1) Consent is recognized in law as a possible defense; (2) The consent is real 
consent; (3) The consent is given by a person who in law is capable of consenting. This means that it 
is actually possible for a person to consent to their own injury and such consent may in certain 
instances be a defence to criminal liability. For instance, a person may consent to certain forms of 
injury that may result from taking part in a sport.48 Where consent is a defence against criminal 
liability (for instance in the case of rape), the act is no longer unlawful because of the principle of 
volenti non fit injuria. The question here that arises is whether a person, and in particular a minor, can 
consent to their own death and as such exonerate the doctor, who assists them to die, from criminal 
liability.  
                                                          
43Ibid; also see D J McQuoid-Mason (note 20 above; 37). 
44 D J McQuoid-Mason (note 20 above;37) ; Also see Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice and Correctional 
Services 2015 (4) SA 50 (GP) at para 38-39. 
45 J K Mason & G T Laurie (eds) Mason and McCall Smith’s Medical Law and Ethics 8 ed (2011) 579-580.  
46 D J McQuoid-Mason (note 20 above; 37). 
47  D J McQuoid-Mason ‘Withholding or withdrawing treatment and palliative treatment hastening death: The 
real reason why doctors are not held legally liable for murder’ 2014 104(2) SAMJ 102-103. 





A person may consent to injury, or even death, if such is a risk associated with medical treatment or 
an operation which a patient has consented to. However, the common law does not allow for a person 
to consent to being killed49 or for a doctor to administer a lethal drug which causes death.50 The 
principle of volenti non fit injuria is not always a defence and the state may still punish people for 
victimless crimes.51 Ultimately, it is public policy which dictates whether consent is valid or not.  
Consent will only be successful as a defence where “it is in the interests of public policy that the act 
of the offender should be rendered not unlawful by the consent of the victim.”52 Although in terms of 
common law, consent to bodily injury or the risk of it is permissible, it is not permissible to consent to 
one’s own death. Neither suicide nor attempted suicide is considered to be a crime53 although assisting 
another person in the act of committing suicide, even if that person has consented to death, is not 
permissible.54 In the foreign case of Baxter v Montana55, the court stated that consent is not a defence 
when the actions are a threat to public peace and there is harm to public policy. In assault cases, for 
instance, where there is disturbance to peace and possible further physical harm to others, consent is 
never a defence.56 However, where a terminally ill patient consents to physician assisted suicide, that 
is a private act which does not encroach on public peace or endanger other members of society and 
such consent is therefore not contrary to public policy.57  
In considering arguments in favour of allowing terminally ill minors to consent to their own death, it 
is submitted that allowing for such causes no physical harm to others nor does it disturb public peace 
or security. It is a highly private and personal decision and therefore cannot be seen to be against 
public policy. If anything, public policy should dictate that to force a child to continue to suffer 
unbearable pain until their death is inhumane and that allowing for such a terminally ill minor to end 
their life in a dignified manner is in fact a necessary promotion of basic human rights.  
                                                          
49 Ex Parte Die Minister van Justisie: In re S v Grotjohn (1970) 2 All SA 491 (A) at pg 499. 
50 S v Hartmann 3 1975 All SA 87 (C) at pg 89. 
51 S Bhamjee ‘Is the right to die with dignity constitutionally guaranteed? Baxter v Montana and other 
developments in patient autonomy and physician assisted suicide’ (2010) 31 (2) Obiter 347. 
52 Ibid. 
53 J Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 5 ed (2016) 582. 
54 S Krause ‘Going gently into that good night: the constitutionality of consent in cases of euthanasia’ (2012) 
33(1) Obiter 48; It was also held in the case of Grotjohn supra that if the person assisting another is the effective 
cause of death, then that person assisting will be guilty of murder. 
55 Baxter v Montana [2009] MT 449. 
56 Baxter v Montana supra at 17. In arriving at its decision, the court considered the case of State v. Mackrill, 
2008 MT 297, 345 Mont. 469, 191 P.3d 451 in which the court looked at disturbance of peace which would be 
considered to be against public policy.  





If consent is regarded as conta bonos mores (it goes against the legal convictions of the community or 
it is against public policy) then it cannot be valid.58 The requirement that consent be in line with 
public policy means that despite consent being voluntary it must still meet an objective legal standard 
in order to be valid.59 The primary things to consider in order to determine if consent is valid is 
Constitutional values, public opinion and prevailing legal norms.60  
The values upon which our Constitution is founded – dignity, equality and freedom – are fundamental 
to determining public policy. In fact the concept of boni mores is ‘now deeply rooted in the 
constitution and its underlying values.’61 In considering the fundamental values upon which the 
Constitution is based, it can be argued that the right to freedom of choice and dignity are values which 
can only be upheld by allowing a terminally ill child who is suffering incredible pain to opt for 
euthanasia. These rights will be discussed in greater detail in the proceeding chapters but at present it 
is necessary to acknowledge that consent cannot be considered to be against public policy if it in fact 
has the effect of promoting a person’s right to dignity and freedom of choice.  
Secondly, for consent to be in line with public policy, it must be consistent with the prevailing legal 
norms that govern the act in question.62 This means analyzing the existing law in relation to the matter 
and ensuring that the act in question is in line with this. In respect of children, s 28(2) of the 
Constitution is of the highest consideration. This section states that the best interests of the child must 
always be of paramount importance in any decision relating to the child. The following chapter will 
deal with this aspect in greater depth but what is necessary is to acknowledge that it may indeed be in 
the best interests of a terminally ill child to choose to end their pain by way of euthanasia instead of 
being forced to suffer indefinitely. 
In deciding whether an act is contra boni mores or not, the courts may also consider the views and 
opinions of the public. This would mean a consideration of the moral or ethical arguments in 
opposition to the practice in question. Public opinion is only really considered, however, where public 
opinion on the matter is strongly in favour of legal sanction.63  
                                                          
58 See A E Strode et al ‘Boni mores and consent for child research in South Africa’ (2015) SAJBL 8(1) 22 for 
discussions on boni mores in respect of children and consent issues.  
59 A E Strode (note 58 above; 23).  
60 Ibid. 
61 African Dawn Property Finance 2 (Pty) Ltd v. Dreams Travel and Tours CC and Others 2011 (3) SA 511 
(SCA) at para 22. 
62 A E Strode (note 58 above; 24). 





Popular arguments against allowing euthanasia are listed below: 
(1) Religious and cultural arguments – It is argued that allowing for assisted suicide is a form of 
liberal individualism which is seen as part of a Western, urban philosophy rather than African 
philosophy which is more community centred as opposed to looking merely at the interests of 
the individual.64 It is therefore argued that little support for euthanasia law will be 
forthcoming in South Africa. This remains untested, however, and it is therefore not certain 
whether this philosophy applies to traditional rural communities only or whether it also 
applies in an urban setting.  
There is a lot of emphasis on individual choice in terms of the Constitution and legislation 
such as the Children’s Act65 and the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act66 provides 
young children with the right to make choices in terms of their own body. This legislation is 
has been part of South African law for a while now and is not challenged on the basis of 
ubuntu.67 Ultimately the purpose of such legislation is to provide people with a choice, it does 
not mean that a person is forced to make use of legislation. If an individual is against 
euthanasia for religious or cultural reasons, and if there was legislation in place allowing for 
it, they would by no means be obligated to request death even though they would have the 
option to do so.  Similarly, a doctor can refuse to assist a patient to die if it is against his 
beliefs to do so and legislation would need to include the option of conscious objection for 
doctors.68 
(2) ‘Slippery slope’ argument – This argument is that to allow for euthanasia would mean that 
there is greater chance of doctors allowing for more and more patients to make use of 
euthanasia, possibly in circumstances where it is not even really what the patient wants. This 
is especially a worry in respect of children who could easily be taken advantage of and may 
be euthanized against their wishes. The Dutch legislation which allows euthanasia has limited 
the circumstances in which a person can request death to only those cases in which a person is 
suffering from a terminal illness but despite this there have been reports that some doctors are 
allowing euthanasia to be carried out on patients with less serious illnesses.69 It can be argued, 
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however, that there will inevitably be members of the profession who will transgress the rules 
and in such instances the professional bodies governing doctors and the courts will need to 
intervene.70 The fact that there are transgressions does not mean that the slippery slope 
argument is a valid one.  
It is also necessary for the Dutch position to be considered carefully and South Africa should 
learn from it when drafting its own legislation in respect of euthanasia, adopting safeguards to 
minimise abuses.71 It is especially necessary that end of life legislation have stringent 
safeguards in respect of children if children are included in the legislation as children require 
even more protection, being more vulnerable to abuses. The South African Law Commission 
draft legislation provides strict criteria that must be fulfilled in order for a person to get 
assistance in death. This will be discussed in greater detail in the chapters to come. 
(3) There are alternatives to death –Palliative care can be used to reduce a patient’s pain and 
suffering over a period of time and it is even suggested that advances in medicine mean that 
cancer patients can die pain-free deaths.72 Hospice also provides care for the terminally ill and 
many medical aids will even pay for home nursing.73 Palliative care, however, often goes only 
so far in relieving suffering and even if a patient’s pain is minimized, their quality of life 
might be extremely low and they may suffer a loss of dignity. This can be prevented if the 
patient is given the option of requesting euthanasia. Furthermore, not every person can afford 
good palliative care, if any at all. Under resourced health facilities also mean that some 
terminally ill patients do not benefit from any form of pain management at all.   
(4) It is always possible that a person may be misdiagnosed, a cure might be found for their 
disease or they could go into remission.74 Euthanasia is final and cannot be reversed. In most 
cases, however, the diagnosis is correct and there is no prospect of recovery and to hope that 
there is a chance of recovery is unrealistic.75 In a case where a patient is suffering from 
terminal cancer and they catch pneumonia, a doctor will usually not administer antibiotics to 
help the patient fight the pneumonia but will instead leave nature to take its course because it 
is considered inhumane to prolong the patient’s suffering in the hope of recovery where the 
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chances of such a person recovering are minimal.76 If this sort of lack of treatment is ethically 
permissible in order to hasten death, then it can also be argued that any other terminally ill 
patient who does not acquire an opportunistic disease but is nearing death, should be 
permitted to request a doctor to cause their death as it could also be considered cruel to allow 
such a patient to continue to suffer.77 
(5) It has been argued that to permit euthanasia would mean that there would be less motivation 
to conduct research on terminal diseases.78 This argument is not logically sound to the extent 
that the purpose of the research is to cure the disease and eradicate it whereas the purpose of 
euthanasia is to ease pain and suffering.79 Given the different aims, it is unlikely that research 
on terminal diseases will cease in favour of euthanasia.  
The other moral and ethical arguments mentioned above specifically with reference to the superficial 
difference between passive and active euthanasia, tend to indicate that morally, active euthanasia, is 
an acceptable practice to the extent that it can end pain and suffering and allow a person to die with 
dignity. This idea would also extend in respect of a terminally ill child. 
 
2.6.A history of assisted suicide and euthanasia at common law level 
2.6.1 Assisted suicide 
The phrase ‘assisted suicide’ is used to define situations where a person receives help from another 
person to commit suicide. For the purposes of this dissertation, it is necessary to consider the legal 
position in respect of assistance given by a doctor to a terminally ill minor to end their life as this is 
essentially what influences legislation. However, the decisions of the court in regard to assisted 
suicide, even where it is not a doctor who provides assistance, is of importance because it sheds light 
on the current legal position in respect of this matter. The case law in this regard tends to indicate that 
where the deceased causes their own death by, for instance, ingesting lethal medication, their action is 
seen as a novus actus intervienus which breaks the causal chain of events and even if another person 
assisted them in acquiring the means to commit suicide, that person will not be guilty of murder. If 
this reasoning is followed, it can be argued that in a case of physician assisted suicide, the doctor 
would not be liable because it is the final action of the patient ingesting the medication that causes 
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their own death. There is, however, no South African case law indicating what the legal position 
would be should the terminally ill patient be a minor. Nevertheless, the development of common law 
generally in respect of euthanasia is necessary in order to ascertain whther such a practice should be 
permissible and whether it should further extend to children. 
2.6.1.1 R v Peverett 1940 AD 213 
This is one of the earliest cases dealing with the issue of assisted suicide. In this case a couple – Mr 
Peverett and Mrs Saunders - both decided to commit suicide by using a pipe to pump poisonous fumes 
from the exhaust pipe of the car into the car itself which would cause their deaths. They sat in the car 
with the windows closed and started the car to cause the fumes to be emitted. Neither of them died but 
were instead found unconscious the next day and Mr Peverett was accused of attempted murder. He 
was convicted on the basis that it was the final act of turning on the engine which was an attempt to 
kill Mrs Saunders – an act which he did intentionally, knowing that it could result in their deaths. 
Watermeyer JA stated the following:  
“In the present case it is clear that the accused contemplated and expected that as a 
consequence of his acts Mrs Saunders would breathe the poisoned gas and die. In the eye of 
the law, therefore, he intended to kill her, however little he may have desired her death.”80 
 
The court also found that his actions went beyond mere acts of preparation but were a means to an 
end:  to cause their deaths.81 The verdict of attempted murder was confirmed in the Appeal Court.  
The court in this case tends to indicate that where a person assists another to commit suicide and it is 
their final act which either causes death, or in this instance, causes injury, that person is guilty of a 
crime. It does not matter that the other party consented to death or to the act which the accused 
performs, the act of the accused in such an instance is still considered to be unlawful.  
 
2.6.1.2 R v Nbakwa 1956 2 SA 557 (SR) 
Unlike in the case of Peverett, the actions of the accused in this case were seen merely as acts of 
preparation and were insufficient to warrant a conviction of murder. The facts of the case are as 
follows: the deceased requested that the accused help her to commit suicide. The accused hung a 
noose from the rafters of a hut and told the deceased to hang herself. The deceased asked the accused 
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to assist her to get up and for a block she could stand on to hang herself. The accused then watched as 
the deceased hung herself.  
It was held in that case that although the accused had provided the deceased with the means to hang 
herself and had persuaded her to do it, it was the actions of the deceased herself in securing the noose 
around her neck and hanging herself that was the ultimate cause of death. The deceased’s own actions 
were seen as a novus actus interveniens. A novus actus is a new intervening act which breaks the 
chain of causation and negates liability of the accused.82  The actions of the victim herself were seen 
in this instance as the direct cause of death.  
Although this case is a South Rhodesian court case, it can have persuasive value in South Africa. In 
assessing liability, the court considered the final act of the deceased to be an act which negated the 
liability of the accused. Despite the fact that the accused assisted the victim in committing suicide, he 
escaped liability on the basis that it was her final act of hanging herself that ultimately caused death. 
In applying this reasoning to a case of physician assisted suicide, it could be argued that the act of a 
doctor prescribing lethal medication is not the final act that causes the death of a patient, just as the 
tying of the noose and helping the deceased onto the block in this instance was not the final cause of 
death. Instead it is the act of the patient in ingesting the lethal medication, as it is the act of the 
deceased in this case in hanging herself that is the final cause of death. It is this act which is a novus 
actus and which breaks the chain of causation and exonerates the party who assisted in the preparatory 
acts leading to the suicide.  
If this logic can be followed, the liability does not rest with the doctor. As suicide is not considered a 
crime in South African law, the act of the deceased causing their own death obviously has no legal 
consequence. By extension, this could mean that a doctor who provides a terminally ill minor with 
lethal medication would not be considered to be liable and in such an instance it would then be the 
decision of the minor whether to ingest the medication or not. There would need to be stringent 
safeguards in place to ensure that this is not abused and that only mature minors are provided with this 
opportunity, however, which will be considered throughout the course of this dissertation. 
 
 
                                                          





2.6.1.3 S v Gordon 1962 (4) SA 727 (N) 
The facts in this case are similar to that of Peverett83 in that the accused and the deceased also formed 
what is commonly known as a ‘suicide pact.’ In terms of this agreement as such, they both decided to 
take lethal tablets acquired by the accused which would result in their death.84 Although the accused 
supplied the deceased with the tablets it could not be shown that he assisted the deceased to take the 
tablets. The accused was charged with murder in that he gave the deceased the lethal medication 
knowing that she would take them and this would cause her death.  
In arriving at a conclusion, the court referred to the case of Nbakwa85 and Peverett.86 The court 
distinguished the facts of this case from those in Peverett because it that case it was the final act of Mr 
Peverett turning on the engine that caused the death of Mrs Saunders whereas in this case, it was the 
act of the deceased taking the tablets herself which caused her own death.87  The circumstances in this 
case are similar to those in Nbakwa: in this case it was in fact the final act of the deceased in 
swallowing the tablets that caused her death and such an action could be seen as a novus actus 
intervienis: 
“The mere fact that he provided the tablets knowing the deceased would take them and would 
probably die cannot be said to constitute, in law, the killing of deceased. The cause of her death 
was her own voluntary and independent act in swallowing the tablets. He undoubtedly aided and 
abetted her to commit suicide, but that is not an offence.”88 
The judgment in this case tends to indicate that in a circumstance where a person voluntarily swallows 
lethal medication to bring about their death, the party which supplied the deceased with the 
medication will not be held liable. By this logic, any doctor who were to supply a patient with lethal 
medication should not be held liable for that act because it is the final act of the patient swallowing 
the medication that leads to their death. This is even despite the doctor foreseeing that the patient 
would take the medication which would result in the patient’s death. As was discussed above, strict 
safeguards need to be put in place, however, to ensure that this is not abused and especially in respect 
of minors to ensure that a child understands the implications of their decision to die. 
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2.6.1.4 Ex Parte Die Minister van Justisie: In re S v Grotjohn (1970) 2 All SA 491 (A) 
According to the court in this case, it depends on the circumstances of each case as to whether a 
person who had assisted another to commit suicide is found guilty of murder. The court stated that the 
decisions reached in Nbakwa89 and Gordon90 are not always necessarily correct in other 
circumstances. In the Grotjohn case the accused handed the deceased a loaded gun after the deceased 
asked him to help her commit suicide. She then used that gun to kill herself. In his judgement, Steyn J 
stated that the final act of the deceased which causes his or her own death does not in all 
circumstances allow for the acquittal of the appellant. It is only in circumstances where the act of the 
deceased is a completely independent act which interrupts or excludes causality of the accused, that 
the accused may escape liability.91 In this case it was held that the accused was both the factual and 
legal cause of the death of the deceased. 
This judgement appears to be different to those given previously in that the act of the accused handing 
the deceased a loaded gun was considered to be more than a mere act of preparation but was seen as 
an act which made the accused liable for the death of the deceased. The judge in this case instead 
decided that the act of the victim shooting herself could not be seen as a new independent intervening 
act which breaks the causal chain of events. If this approach were to be followed in respect of a 
physician providing a terminally ill patient with lethal medication, the physician would be considered 
the factual and legal cause of death for providing the means to commit suicide and such a physician 
would then be held liable.  
 
2.6.1.5 S v Hibbert (1979) 2 All SA 323 (D) 
The accused in this case handed his depressed wife a gun and she proceeded to use this gun to shoot 
herself dead. She had previously expressed a desire to commit suicide. The judge in this case, 
following on from the decision in Grotjohn,92 stated that even though the final act of pulling the 
trigger was not that of the accused, the accused had begun the events that led to his wife’s death and 
her final act could not be seen as an independent act which broke the causal chain of events.93 It was 
also found that the accused had the necessary intention required for a conviction of murder. Despite 
the conviction, however, the accused’s sentence was suspended wholly.  
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The fact that the court did not hand down a hefty sentence in this case tends to indicate that the judge 
saw no reason to impose a harsh punishment on the accused, especially given the fact that the victim 
had requested death. Ultimately, however, this interpretation of actions dictates that a doctor who was 
to assist a patient to commit suicide would also be guilty of murder. In this case the final act of the 
deceased pulling the trigger of the gun was not considered to be a novus actus. If this line of reasoning 
is followed in respect of a case of physician assisted suicide, it would be decided that the final act of 
the patient, adult or minor, ingesting the lethal medication could not be considered a novus actus 
either and the doctor would be unable to escape liability for the murder.  
 
2.6.2 Voluntary active euthanasia  
This differs from assisted suicide because it is the act of the doctor specifically (or another such 
person) that is the final act which causes the death of someone. In physician assisted suicide, the 
physician is considered merely to be a facilitator, whereas the role of the doctor in respect of 
euthanasia is active.94A common example is where, for instance, a doctor administers a lethal 
injection to a terminally ill patient in order to end their suffering. Despite this being considered an act 
of mercy and is in fact often referred to as “mercy killing,” it is still regarded as murder in terms of 
criminal law. The cases, thus far, are as follows: 
 
2.6.2.1 R v Dawidow WLD 155 (unreported) 
The mother of the accused in this case was suffering from a terminal illness and suffering from 
unbearable pain. Her son (the accused) did what he could to try and help his mother but her condition 
did not improve. She was very depressed and requested that her pain and suffering be ended by way 
of lethal injection. The accused, eventually and largely as a result of his own emotional suffering, shot 
his mother. He did not end his mother’s life in the manner requested but he saw it as a merciful death 
nonetheless. 
The accused in this case was acquitted on the basis that he did not have mental capacity at the time of 
commission of the crime due to the emotional state he had been in. Despite his acquittal, however, it 
was clear that his act was considered unlawful.  
It is commonly known that in the case where a person is suffering from a terminal illness, their 
relatives also often suffer emotionally. As can be seen in this case, the accused, a relative of the 
deceased could no longer bear the suffering of his parent and in this emotional state of turmoil, ended 
                                                          





her life. What is important to take note of from this case is that the court still regarded the action of 
the accused in this case as unlawful despite the fact that the deceased had requested death and had 
thus consented to it. It could perhaps be argued, however, that in this instance even if consent to death 
were valid, the deceased had consented to death by lethal injection not by being shot and therefore the 
action of the accused would go beyond the scope of the consent given anyway. 
 
2.6.2.2 S v De Bellocq (1975) 1 All SA 6 (T) 
The accused in this case was a young, unmarried woman who gave birth to a premature baby. It soon 
became apparent that the child has a disease called toxoplasmosis. Being a medical student, the 
mother understood the prognosis and that there was ‘no chance of the child living for any length of 
time or becoming an intelligent human being.’95 The accused decided it would be best to end the 
child’s life and so she drowned the child.  
The court accepted that at the time of the perpetration of the act, the accused was in a highly 
emotional state.96 However De Wet JP stated that being in a state of emotional turmoil did not have 
the effect of reducing intention and that she was therefore guilty of murder.  
However, on account of extenuating circumstances, the accused was discharged under the condition 
that she appear for sentencing if called upon to do so. This was the first case showing a reluctance by 
a court to punish a person for ‘mercy killing’ and the conviction appeared to be more of a symbolic 
gesture of upholding the law rather than aimed at punishment. 
 
2.6.2.3 S v Hartmann 3 1975 All SA 87 (C) 
The accused in this case, the son of the deceased and a medical practitioner, had treated his father for 
cancer for an extended period of time. His father’s condition deteriorated to the extent that there was 
no longer any question of a cure, he was bedridden and suffering great pain.97  Eventually, the accused 
injected a lethal dose of Pentothal into his father’s drip which caused the latter’s death in seconds. 
Van Winsen J stated that while the deceased may have died of natural causes mere hours later, “the 
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law is clear that it nonetheless constitutes the crime of murder even if all that an accused has done is 
to hasten the death of a human being who was due to die in any event.” 98  
Although the act of the accused could be seen as ‘mercy killing’ the court nevertheless held that the 
motive of his act, to relieve his father’s pain and suffering, was irrelevant. The accused was found to 
have the necessary intention for the crime. Even though the accused contended that the deceased had 
consented to his death, the court held that even if this was accepted, it would not exclude criminal 
responsibility.  
Although the accused was convicted of murder the sentence handed down was one year’s 
imprisonment, he was only detained until the rising of the court and the sentence given was suspended 
for one year. The court stated that the chances of the accused committing a similar crime were 
negligible and so a heafty sentence was not warranted. The Medical and Dental Council took 
disciplinary action against Hartmann, however, and he was suspended temporarily. 
Once again, the court imposed a lenient sentence on the accused which indicates a reluctance of the 
court to punish in an instance of ‘mercy killing.’ Ultimately it could be argued that there is no point in 
having a criminal sanction for a particular act if there is no sanction attached to the commission of the 
crime. Instead it can be argued that it would be preferable to have legislation in place allowing for a 
person to request euthanasia and for there to be stringent safeguards in place in order to prevent abuse 
of the practice.  
 
2.6.2.4 S v Marengo (1991) 3 All SA 784 (W) 
In this case the accused shot and killed her elderly father who was suffering from cancer. She pleaded 
guilty to the charge of murder and stated that her act was an act of mercy. The deceased was 
terminally ill and required incessant care. Eventually the build up of pressure on her and the emotional 
turmoil culminated in her shooting and killing the deceased. She thought that by doing this she was 
providing her father with a quiet and merciful death.99 
The court found the accused guilty but held that the sentence did not need to involve a deterrent factor 
as the circumstances in which the accused found herself were extreme and it was very unlikely that 
the accused would commit a similar crime again.100 She was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment 
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which was suspended for five years. Following the approach in the De Bellocq101 and Hartmann102 
cases, it is clear that the court in such instances is reluctant to impose punishment, taking into account 
the uniqueness of the particular situation.  
 
2.6.2.5 S v Smorenburg 1992 (2) SACR 389 (C) 
The accused in this case was a nursing sister who was charged with two counts of attempted murder 
for injecting two patients with a large dose of insulin.103 The case is interesting because it deals with 
the conflict faced by medical professionals between their ethical and moral duty to preserve life on 
one hand and on the other hand, not wanting to see a patient suffer immense pain.  
She admitted to her conduct and was found guilty of attempted murder on both counts. She stated that 
she had acted in the manner she had done because she wanted to end the suffering of the patients in 
question.104  
In sentencing the accused, the court considered her position at the time when the acts were 
perpetrated. She was under severe stress as a result of her job, especially as she witnessed suffering of 
terminally ill patients on a daily basis and could do nothing to alleviate their pain. 105 The first 
deceased, Mr Hobbs, was suffering from cancer and following certain medical procedures, he had 
become incontinent. He suffered a loss of dignity and became withdrawn and depressed as a result.106 
The second victim was Mrs Frames. She suffered from a number of ailments and had also been 
diagnosed with cancer. After she suffered a stroke, her family requested that treatment should be 
ceased. In order to give the patient what she considered to be a dignified death, the accused injected 
the victim to bring about such a death.107  
In sentencing the accused, the court considered that she had reported her acts immediately after doing 
them and that she had believed at the time that what she had done was right although she later realised 
that this was not the case as a matter of law.108  
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Friedman JP stated that in determining a sentence, the interests of society need to be considered – 
Both at large and the nursing profession. The court was satisfied that the accused was remorseful and 
that having resigned from her job and being deregistered as a nurse, she poses no threat to the 
community at large.109 In respect of the nursing profession, it was stated that it was the task of the 
Nursing Council to uphold the ethics of the profession and the actions of the accused should be seen 
individually as an isolated circumstance which does not cause permanent damage to the profession.110 
Taking into consideration all the mitigating factors, the accused was sentenced to three months’ 
imprisonment which was suspended in its entirety provided that she did not contravene the Nursing 
Act111 again.112 
Once again in this case the court took a lenient approach in sentencing. What should be taken from 
this case is the sheer pain and suffering experienced by the patients to the extent that the accused 
wanted to end their lives. Although she realised that what she had done was unlawful, she justified her 
actions by saying that she wanted the victims to have a dignified death and the court took this into 
account when it came to sentencing. The manner in which the conditions of the victims are described 
show that the victims suffered what was considered to be an undignified existence, so much so that 
the accused felt that it would be best to end their suffering and allow them to die a dignified death. 
The court did, to an extent, recognise that her motive was not a malevolent one and this further played 
a role in the lenient sentence imposed.  
 
2.6.2.6 Clarke v Hurst NO and Others 1992 (4) SA 630 (D) 
Although this case dealt specifically with the legality of a legal will, it is still imperative that this 
dissertation consider the verdict to the extent that a form of passive euthanasia was decided to be 
permissible. In this case the applicant applied to be appointed as curatrix personae for her husband 
(the patient) so that she could have the ability to take the decision to cease life sustaining treatment of 
the patient, namely removal of a naso-gastric or other ‘non-natural feeding regimes’ despite the fact 
that this would hasten the death of the patient.113 Mr Clarke, the patient, was in a persistent vegetative 
state with no prospect of recovery.114 
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The question before the court was essentially whether it would be wrongful for Mrs Clarke to consent 
to treatment that would shorten the life of the patient or consent to removal of treatment on his 
behalf.115 Thirion J stated, in arriving at a decision, that it would be necessary to consider the interests 
of society. Public policy dictates that it is acceptable for a doctor to remove life-sustaining treatment 
from a patient. It was argued that in fact there is no difference between the removal of treatment and 
not beginning treatment at all.116 Furthermore, it was successfully argued that the applicant was acting 
in the best interests of the patient and was consequently successful.117 
The court in this case acknowledged that a person’s quality of life is of utmost importance, more so 
than the sanctity of life. In looking at a person’s right to dignity and acknowledging that they should 
have autonomy, a respect for the sanctity of life is arguably promoted as well. The court in this case 
allowed for passive euthanasia to take place and this makes it necessary to consider whether active 
euthanasia would also be permissible. As considered above, there are many philosophical arguments 
(see 2.1. above) to the effect that the two forms of euthanasia are actually no different. If the court in 
Clarke allowed for passive euthanasia to take place, and active and passive euthanasia can in fact be 
considered to be one and the same, the voluntary active euthanasia would also be permissible. It is 
especially important to note in this case that the court did take cognisance of the fact that the patient 
was a member of the South African Voluntary Euthanasia Society (SAVES) and had a living will in 
which he stated that he did not want to be kept alive artificially if there was no prospect of recovery. 
The patient had made it clear that should such a situation arise, he essentially consented to the 
artificial means being removed and death resulting. Following from this, it could be argued that if 
such a request in this instance is granted, a similar request for voluntary active euthanasia should also 
be granted.  
In the case of a minor making a request for active euthanasia, as stated before, their maturity would 
need to be considered and further safeguards would need to be in place in order to ensure that the 
child actually understands the decision they are making. Further, what is interesting to note from this 
case is that it was considered to be in the best interests of the patient to remove the life sustaining 
treatment in order to bring about death. If it was concluded in this case that the patient did not have a 
good quality of life and that it was in fact in his best interests for treatment to be ceased, then it could 
be argued that similar logic could be applied in respect of a minor. In an instance where a child is 
suffering from a terminal illness and has a poor quality of life, it could be argued that it is in the best 
interests of that child, should the child request it, to have their suffering ended  by way of active 
euthanasia.  
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2.6.2.7 Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others 
2015 (4) SA  50 (GP) 
This case is considered to be a landmark case in that the court granted an order allowing a medical 
practitioner to assist the applicant to commit suicide by supplying him with a lethal substance that 
would cause death. The applicant, Mr Stransham-Ford, had stage 4 terminal cancer and sought an 
order that would allow him to gain assistance from a medical practitioner to end his life and in doing 
so, that medical practitioner would not face criminal sanction.118 Despite the fact that the court granted 
the above-mentioned order, the applicant was in fact unable to make use of it because he died on the 
day that the judgement was given.  
The applicant, a highly qualified individual who was also a practicing advocate, detailed to what 
extent he was in extreme pain and suffered from nausea, vomiting, constipation, disorientation among 
other things. He was unable to get out of bed and had injections and drips, suffered from anxiety, 
could not sleep without morphine or other painkillers and the pain medication he used made him 
drowsy.119 It is clear from the description of his condition that his quality of life had been substantially 
diminished. He had also tried various alternative treatments, all of which had been unsuccessful.120 
 
The applicant relied heavily on his Constitutional rights to show that in fact he should not be forced to 
continue to suffer but should be allowed to opt for a dignified death. Section 1 of the Constitution 
provides that South Africa is a state founded on the values of ‘human dignity, the achievement of 
equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.’121 The applicant successfully relied on 
the interrelationship between dignity, privacy and freedom and security of the person, contending that 
these rights mean that the value and worth of every individual should be acknowledged.122 Ultimately, 
the right to dignity is a right which informs all others and should be respected and protected in all 
circumstances.123 
The court went on to state that quality of life should prevail over the sanctity of life principle and it is 
the values enshrined in the Constitution rather than public opinion or religious beliefs that should 
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inform the decision of the court.124 Fabricius J went on to state that a person has no duty to live but 
merely a right to life which essentially they can waive.125 A further argument proffered by the 
applicant was that it is considered humane to euthanize an animal that is in extreme pain because to 
prolong its life is considered to be cruel and allows for unnecessary suffering.126 The question is then 
why are humans not given the option of death with dignity as well? 
The court gave an order to the effect that the applicant could request that a medical practitioner assist 
him to commit suicide and that such a medical practitioner would not incur criminal sanction for 
assisting him.127 Despite the fact that the applicant died shortly before the judgement was handed 
down and although it is not binding on any other High Court as it is a judgement by a single judge, it 
still has persuasive value. It still remains, however, in the absence of legislation that a person must 
apply for an order allowing them to make use of physician assisted suicide or euthanasia in order for 
the doctor who assists them to not be help criminally liable.128 
The abovementioned case law appears to indicate that the common law is moving towards a more 
lenient approach to euthanasia. Stransham-Ford129 is the first case, however, where the court actually 
stated that it would be an unjustifiable infringement on a terminally ill patient’s constitutional rights 
not to allow them to make use of voluntary active euthanasia. Despite this being a landmark decision, 
it does not change the fact that a terminally ill patient would have to apply to court to get such an 
order. These sorts of cases are only to be decided on a case by case basis and so this does not change 
the position for the average South African who cannot afford the expensive legal fees associated with 
such litigation – even less so for a terminally ill child who would also require assistance to litigate. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Despite euthanasia being considered to be murder in terms of South African criminal law, it appears 
that that convictions on this count do not lead to hefty sentences. The courts appear reluctant to punish 
the actions of a person who wished to put someone else ‘out of their misery’ and sentences tend to be 
suspended. At common law level, and with reference to the ethics of the medical profession, it 
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appears that passive euthanasia is permissible in circumstances where a patient has no quality of life 
and no prospect of recovery at all. The difference between active and passive euthanasia is essentially 
an artificial one so it can logically be argued that if passive euthanasia is not considered to be 
reprehensible then the same should apply in respect of active euthanasia. The ethical guidelines of the 
medical profession are centred on consideration of the best interests of the patient, and in respect of 
children, this is bolstered by the best interests of the child doctrine in s 28(2) of the Constitution. It 
can be argued that it is in fact in the best interests of a child and any other terminally ill patient to 
have their suffering ended and die with dignity. This will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
chapter.  
Although the court has taken a more strict approach in respect of convicting the perpetrators in 
euthanasia cases, it appears that the courts often come to the conclusion that even if a person is 
assisted in that they are provided with the means to commit suicide, it is their own voluntary act that 
is a novus actus and breaks the chain of events, thus exonerating the one who assisted them from 
liability. Ultimately, it can be argued that it is the act of the patient swallowing the lethal medication 
in an instance physician assisted suicide which is the cause of death, not the act of the doctor 
prescribing the medication. Each case is, however, dependant on the particular circumstances.  
The Stransham-Ford130 case shows a significant development in our law and recognises that a person 
should have the right to die with dignity. This case raises serious questions in regard to our current 
law and begs the question whether legislation regarding voluntary active euthanasia should be 
promulgated in order to allow ordinary people to die with dignity, instead of only those who can 
afford to apply to court. It is the author’s opinion that such legislation should also allow for competent 
minors to request euthanasia provided they are sufficiently mature to make such a decision as they 
also enjoy the same rights as adults. This dissertation will consider in subsequent chapters what 
legislation should be promulgated, what safeguards should be included in such legislation and how the 
rights of terminally ill minors can also be upheld whilst ensuring minimal abuse. 
                                                          




CHAPTER THREE: APPLICATION OF BIOETHICAL PRINCIPLES 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As can be seen from the previous chapter, South Africa currently does not permit a person to request 
euthanasia or physician assisted suicide. To assist another person to die is unlawful and is a criminal 
offence. This chapter will consider whether the prohibition of voluntary active euthanasia for a patient 
suffering from a terminal illness is an unjustified infringement of a person’s constitutional rights, 
looking particularly at the rights as they pertain to children. Children enjoy all the rights in terms of 
the Constitution, such as the right to dignity, privacy, bodily integrity and equality, as well as the 
rights relating specifically to children in s 28 of the Constitution.1 As children are seen as vulnerable 
groups of society, it is necessary to provide them with extra protection. This protection should not, 
however, be at the expense of rights they are fully competent to exercise. This chapter will consider 
the bioethical principles protecting human rights, the international framework protecting human rights 
as well as considering the meaning and extent of the rights enshrined in the Constitution. Analysis of 
these rights provides a solid basis for the argument that a terminally ill mature minor should be 
permitted to request euthanasia provided they are sufficiently competent to make such a decision. 
3.2 Bioethical principles protecting human rights 
 
Patient autonomy, the principle of beneficence, non-maleficence and justice and fairness are the 
bioethical principles which form the basis of the protection of human rights in a health care context.2 
These principles are found in various international legal frameworks including the International Bill 
of Rights and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.3 The International Bill of Rights 
includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),4 International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)5 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
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(ICCPR).6 These principles are also found in the South African Bill of Rights7 and the South African 
Patients’ Rights Charter.8 The bioethical principles are often used by doctors as a justification in the 
argument against allowing euthanasia. However, these principle are ultimately aimed at achieving the 
best result for a patient, and it is submitted that in a case of a terminally ill child suffering immense 
pain, the best alternative is often death.  
3.2.1 Patient autonomy 
This is the bioethical principle that rejects paternalism, to an extent, and acknowledges that patients 
have a right to make decisions about their own body and what is done to it.9 This means that a person 
can make their own decisions in respect of medical treatment and surgery. The extent to which a child 
has a right to autonomy will be discussed in depth in the following chapter.  
3.2.2 Beneficence  
This principle is that a doctor should promote the welfare of patients and should act in a manner 
which preserves life.10 This is in line with the right to life as enshrined in the Constitution.11 The 
principle of beneficence means that a patient who is terminally ill should be encouraged to undergo 
palliative care instead of ending their life.12 It is specifically stated above as including the promotion 
of the welfare of patients. Welfare is something more than mere survival and can be argued to 
encompass the need for a quality life rather than merely life itself. In support of the argument for 
euthanasia, this principle may not entail a need to protect life no matter its form, but rather the 
protection and promotion of quality life. In the case of Stransham-Ford13 it was emphasized that 
although the right to life is of paramount importance and that life is sacred, the quality of the life 
should take precedence over the sanctity of life principle.14 Further, in the case of Clarke15 and the 
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English case of Airdale,16 the courts have acknowledged that life should not be preserved at any cost 
with no regard to the quality of life.17 It is therefore argued that in a case where a terminally ill patient 
has no quality of life, the principle of beneficence might justify ending a patient’s life prematurely 
through euthanasia, if they so request.18 It is also argued that one of the key aspects of the medical 
profession, and the principle of beneficence, is compassion. Compassion demands that a patient’s 
choice be respected even if this means that they choose to end their life in order to end their 
suffering.19 
3.2.3  Non-Maleficence 
The principle of non-maleficence means that doctors should not unnecessarily harm patients. Active 
euthanasia then appears to be contrary to this principle, specifically because it could lead to the abuse 
of vulnerable members of society.20 There is particularly a concern in respect of children that a child 
who is terminally ill may be coerced into agreeing to euthanasia if the practice is legally permissible 
in respect of children. This concern needs to be addressed but it has been suggested that provided 
there are ‘minimum safeguards’ in place in respect of the legislation, abuses can be prevented.21 The 
South African Law Commission has in its report22 proposed such safeguards although the draft 
legislation does not provide that children would be permitted to make use of euthanasia or physician 
assisted suicide at all. In the case of children, it must be acknowledged that additional safeguards 
would need to be put in place in order to ensure that children are protected from being coerced into 
consenting to death. Nevertheless, it is not prudent to simply exclude children completely because of 
the potential for abuse. Instead children should be provided with a choice but legislation should 
ensure minimal abuse. This will be discussed in further detail in the proceeding chapters.  
If a person is forced to stay alive until they die naturally from the disease or illness from which they 
are suffering, it is condemning them to a life of ‘mere existence’ which is considered to be a violation 
of a person’s right to dignity.23 This can be considered to be a violation of the non-maleficence 
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principle as well because in such a case it could be argued that harm is being caused to the patient by 
forcing them to continue to exist with no quality of life.24 Especially in a case where a mature minor 
wishes to end their life and is unable to but must instead suffer until their death, it can be argued that 
the infringement of their human rights to dignity, bodily integrity and privacy can be considered a 
harm. Further discussion on human rights will follow.  
3.2.4  Justice and fairness 
This is a medical principle intertwined with the right to equality. This principle means that doctors are 
expected to treat patients equally and not to discriminate against any patient.25 An example of such 
discrimination taking place would be where there are two patients who are terminally ill, one on a 
ventilator, and one not yet the doctor is permitted to remove the ventilator and bring about death for 
the first patient but cannot actively cause the death of the second patient.26 This is because passive 
euthanasia is legally permissible whereas active euthanasia is not. The patient who is not on a 
ventilator would only able to legally end his life if he were to approach a court and get an order 
allowing for him to acquire the assistance of a doctor to die. In the scenario described, both patients 
are suffering a loss of dignity and lack quality of life, yet only one of the patients can bring about their 
death legally. In both cases, the elements of causation and intention are the same and there appears to 
be no difference between the cases in respect of unlawfulness or moral or ethical considerations.27 
In applying this principle in respect of the issue at hand, it can logically be argued that this principle 
permits active euthanasia to take place in order to treat a patient who is not on life sustaining 
equipment in the same manner as one who is. Further discussion on the right to equality will follow in 
this chapter. 
 
3.3 Children’s rights 
 
The Constitution is the supreme  law of the land and hence should in every matter be given utmost 
importance, specifically the Bill of Rights enshrined therein.28 Section 2 of the Constitution provides 
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that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid. This can mean that 
although South African patients may be granted additional rights not mentioned in the Constitution by 
professional ethical guidelines, their rights may not be limited unless it is justifiable in an open and 
democratic society as provided for in s 36 of the Constitution.29 Generally, rights should be construed 
broadly rather than narrowly and thereafter it can be decided whether the right should be limited, 
rather than automatically depriving individuals of fundamental human rights.30 The words ‘law and 
conduct’ include professional ethical rules such as those contained in the Health Professions Council 
of South Africa (“HPCSA”)31 rules and guidelines for all medical practitioners. The HPCSA imposes 
rules on doctors that may provide more rights for patients than stipulated in the Constitution but it is 
impermissible for the rights of patients to be diminished by medical practitioners (such as the right to 
dignity and the right to bodily integrity) unless it can be shown by the council that such a limitation of 
the rights in question is justifiable in an open and democratic society (s 36).32 
Our Constitution provides for the rights of every individual in South Africa but extra, special 
provision is made for children in terms of s 28 of the Constitution. Children are provided with special 
protection because they are seen as vulnerable groups of society given that generally children are 
solely dependent on parents and are also still developing. It is for this reason that extra legislation has 
been put in place in order to protect children.33 In the case of Bhe34 at par 52, Langa J stated that not 
only do the rights expressly mentioned in s 28 extend to children but also all the other rights in the 
Constitution. Although s 28 mentions specific rights that pertain to children, the right to equality, 
dignity, bodily and psychological integrity and the right to individual autonomy extend to children as 
well. It is important to note that in terms of s28(2) of the Constitution, the best interests of the child 
should always be of paramount importance in every decision taken that relates to the child.  In 
addition to the rights provided for in s 28 of the Constitution, the Children’s Act35 sets out specifically 
the law relating to children.  
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Children’s rights can be categorised into 2 separate categories, both of which require consideration in 
order to decide whether particular decisions can be made by minors. Boezaart suggests that the first 
theme relates to protection of children given that children are completely dependent on others in most 
instances because they are considered to lack capacity; the second theme relates to autonomy of 
children and what that entails.36 It is therefore necessary to decide how far the need for protection of 
children extends and where their right to autonomy begins. This chapter will analyse these themes in 
order to show that a terminally ill mature minor should have a right to decide to die and that such over 
protection of such children does more harm than good in the context of euthanasia.  
In line with the first of the abovementioned themes, many rights are limited in respect of children 
such as the right to vote. The reason for this is that it is considered to be a decision that requires a 
degree of maturity that perhaps a minor does not have or it is considered that a minor cannot make an 
educated decision such as that. The legislature had to draw certain lines in respect of specific 
decisions and actions in many cases, whether a child is competent or not cannot be decided on a case 
by case basis simply because there are too many children to decide upon. For instance, for a court or 
other authority to decide if every minor was competent to enter into a contract or not is impossible. 
This rationale is different when applied in respect of children making end of life decisions, however. 
The number of children with terminal diseases who may want to make use of euthanasia is surely not 
large and so it could be potentially decided on a case by case basis whether or not a child is 
sufficiently mature to make an end of life decision or not, just as it is possible to establish whether a 
child is sufficiently mature to consent to medical treatment or surgery.37 
There is increasing support for the view that children’s rights should be considered equal to adult’s 
rights and that it is only when there is a good reason to do so that a child’s right should be limited. In 
the case of S v M,38 the majority stated that children should be seen as individual rights bearers and 
not merely extensions of their parents.  Furthermore, children should not be seen merely as 
dependents but rather as equal bearers of rights.39 If a right has been limited, it is then necessary to 
consider whether limiting the right is in order to protect the child or because of their lack of 
development at that age.40 Whether there is a legitimate reason for limiting the child’s right is 
determined according to whether the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
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society.41 In respect of the rights at stake in relation to prohibiting euthanasia for mature minors, it can 
indeed be argued that limitation of such rights is not justified in an open and democratic society and 
that, should legislation in respect of euthanasia be promulgated, children should be afforded the same 
rights as adults as they are considered to be equal rights bearers.   
 
3.4  International legal framework protecting children’s rights 
 
South Africa is party to certain international conventions aimed at protecting and enhancing the rights 
of children. These include the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the African 
Charter on Human and People's Rights and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child. South Africa has ratified these conventions in order to show its commitment for human rights 
and specifically the protection of children’s rights.42 
Besides our own Constitution providing that the best interests of the child are always of paramount 
importance, Article 20 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child43 also provides 
that the best interests of the child should always be taken into consideration and that the parents are 
responsible for ensuring this. In addition, the state has a responsibility to support and assist parents in 
their task.44 This can be interpreted as a responsibility on the state to implement legislation which 
promotes the best interests of the child because this would be a step that assists and supports parents 
in doing the same. If it can be shown that legislation allowing for children to make use of euthanasia 
is in fact in the best interests of the child, then it would ostensibly be the responsibility of the state to 
implement such legislation. The best interests of the child will be discussed in greater depth in the 
following chapter.  
Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that: ‘  
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'Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express  
those views freely in all matters affecting the child. The views of the child being given due weight in 
accordance with the age and maturity of the child.’45  
The Convention also provides that a child should have access to the ‘best available standards of 
healthcare,’ the right to information, the right not to be subjected to cruel inhuman or degrading 
treatment and also the right to privacy.46 These rights will be discussed in greater detail below so as to 
show that refusing to allow terminally ill children to make use of euthanasia is in fact an unjustifiable 
infringement on these rights.  
The Declaration of Human Rights in Article 1 also provides that children must be recognised as 
human beings with rights like any other and specifically entitled to the rights of freedom, equality and 
dignity which are the most fundamental of human rights.47 This means that in a health care 
environment, practitioners are expected to treat children in the same manner as adults, providing them 
with equal respect for dignity and life which could also include allowing a terminally ill mature minor 
to request euthanasia.48 
3.5 Analysis of rights 
 
 Below each of the rights pertaining to the request for euthanasia will be discussed in detail in order to 
ascertain whether such rights are being unjustifiably infringed if euthanasia is not permitted for 
mature minors who are competent to make such a decision. As can be seen below, by prohibiting 
voluntary active euthanasia, certain rights are being unjustifiably infringed and prohibiting voluntary 
active euthanasia for terminally ill mature minors actually does more harm than good by compelling 
such a child to continue to suffer until they die naturally.                             
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Section 1 of the Constitution provides the following:  
“the Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic State founded on the following values: (a) 
Human dignity, the achievement of equality and their advancement of human rights and freedoms.”49 
Not only is the right to dignity mentioned in s 1 of the Constitution but is further emphasises in s 7: 
“(1) This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all 
people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom. (2) 
The State must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.”50 
Section 10 of the Constitution provides directly that every person has the right to dignity.51 This is an 
inherent right that attaches to all people simply because they are human and thus extends to both 
adults and children alike. The right to dignity is a right which is fundamental in the interpretation of 
all other rights in the Constitution.52 In the case of S v Makwanyane, O’Regan J stated that the right to 
life is substantially diminished without the right to dignity and that the right to dignity corresponds 
with an acknowledgement of human worth.53 The right to dignity is fundamental to our legal system 
and is a cornerstone of the Constitution.54  It is not a right that should ever be limited, as it is a right 
which ‘requires us to acknowledge the value and worth of all individuals as members of society.’55 A 
minor child, simply because he/she is a human, should be afforded the right to dignity.  The right to 
dignity also applies in respect of death and it is provided for in the HPCSA guidelines that the process 
of dying should be a dignified one.56 
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Fundamental to the right to dignity is the right to decide what happens to one’s body – For instance, 
whether one wishes to refuse or consent to treatment. 57 This means that should a person decide that 
their life is no longer worthwhile and they wish to end their pain and suffering, such a decision should 
be respected, and to do so would be to uphold the person’s right to dignity.58 
The right to dignity could also be seen, to an extent, as a subjective right.59 This means that a person 
can decide himself/herself what he/she considers to be a dignified life and what is not. If a terminally 
ill patient considers his/her life to be an undignified one, then their subjective right to dignity is being 
infringed.  It is often suggested that children often will not regard the right to dignity in the same 
manner as an adult. However, mature minors and surely even younger children would regard certain 
ways of living as being an undignified existence. For instance, a child who cannot use the toilet or 
wash herself but has to be helped with everything would surely consider that to be an undignified 
existence. In such an instance, the child in question should have the opportunity to make use of 
euthanasia, provided of course that all the other requirements are met.60 Terminally ill patients often 
argue that suffering until death cannot be considered a dignified way of life. The right to dignity 
means that a person should be permitted to make the decision to die in a manner that they consider to 
be dignified as opposed to having to suffer. What it is essential to understand is that the option of 
requesting euthanasia should merely be offered to children who are sufficiently competent to make 
such a decision. This does not mean that every child that is terminally ill should be euthanized.  
The court in the case of Stransham-Ford61 considered the right to dignity in some depth and it was 
decided that the life that the applicant was living at the time, that is, suffering in his final stages of 
cancer, could not be considered a dignified existence. In considering the quality of life that a terminal 
patient endures in their final months before death, Fabricius J concluded that there was no dignity in a 
life lived in severe pain, being constantly medicated and being unaware of one’s surroundings and 
loved ones, being confused and also not being able to take care of one’s own hygiene.62 Furthermore, 
the court considered that in many cases, a terminal patient lives the last part of their life in a hospice 
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or hospital, away from home and often all alone.  Such a patient may die without even being aware of 
their loved ones saying goodbye because of being in a dissociative state as a result of a combination 
of their medication and disease. Ultimately the court, having considered the type of life such a patient 
is forced to endure, decided in favour of the applicant on the basis that there was no dignity in 
continuing to live such a life. A mature minor suffering from a similar terminal illness to the applicant 
in that case, could also easily argue that their right to dignity is being unjustifiably infringed and that 
they should be given the option to request death.  
In the case of Baxter,63 the judge in arriving at the decision that prohibiting physician assisted suicide 
was an unjustifiable infringement on a terminally ill patient’s rights, pointed out that if a terminally ill 
patient is not able to acquire assistance from their physician to end their life, then they may have to 
resort to other undignified means to end their suffering.64 This would mean, for instance, hanging 
oneself. Such measures are an even greater violation of a person’s right to dignity and cause 
unnecessary suffering to both the patient and their family.65  
A child who is suffering from severe pain and is told that he/she has no prospect of recovery might 
also see suicide as a way out. The issue becomes even more complex in respect of children because 
children are often far less likely to be able to acquire the means to carry out a full proof method of 
committing suicide. This means a child may be more likely to fail in a suicide attempt because he may 
not have sufficient knowledge or resources to accomplish a successful suicide. This will often result 
in an even more painful existence for a child who may be further injured by the failed attempt, 
whereas an option to make use of euthanasia would mean that such a child could die a dignified death. 
Furthermore, a minor is usually solely dependent on his/her parents. This means that in most 
instances, a minor is not even capable of acquiring the means to commit suicide. An adult, on the 
other hand, even if he/she cannot make use of euthanasia, is generally capable of acquiring the means 
to end their suffering by committing suicide. This essentially means that children are forced to suffer 
with no alternative, whereas adults are in a much better position to be able to end their suffering. In 
considering this, it is even more necessary that death with dignity legislation should be considered in 
respect of children, perhaps even more so than adults for the abovementioned reason. Legislation 
allowing for euthanasia will mean that the decision to die can be regulated by medical practitioners 
instead of patients having to resort to “more drastic, painful and inhumane ways of ending [their] 
suffering.”66 
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The question of the right to dignity specifically in respect of children was considered in the Teddy 
Bear Clinic67 case. In that case the court looked at s 15 and s 16 of the Sexual Offences Act.68 Section 
15 provided that any person who engaged in sexual intercourse with a child would be guilty of an 
offence, even if there was consent and both parties were children. The legislation essentially 
criminalized all sexual acts between adolescents (12 – 15 year olds). Section 16(1) of the Act 
provided that any person who committed an act of sexual violation against a child and even if the 
child consented to the act, shall be guilty of the offence of sexual violation. S 16(2) provided that both 
parties to the act must be charged with contravention of s 16(1) of the Act.  
The Constitutional Court held that both s 15 and s 16 of the Act were invalid as they violated the 
rights of adolescents – namely their right to dignity and privacy – and to do so was not in the best 
interests of the child. The court stated that children enjoy all the fundamental rights in the 
Constitution, although some of the rights listed, for instance the right to vote, is only applicable to 
adults. Although some rights are limited in respect of children, the court held that there should be no 
limitation on the right to dignity and privacy in respect of children.69 
The court in that case places specific emphasis on a child’s right to dignity and privacy, stating that 
those rights are of fundamental importance and should not be limited. In respect of the right to 
dignity, the court considered legislation prohibiting sexual activity between 2 consenting adolescents 
to be an unjustifiable infringement on their right to dignity. The decision to have sex is a very 
personal one and obviously not one which the court considered should be readily encroached on by 
the state. Restricting the decision to end one’s suffering if a person is terminally ill could also be 
considered an encroachment on a very personal aspect of a minor’s life and not something that should 
be prohibited by the state. In taking this argument further and applying the reasoning in the Teddy 
Bear case, it could further be argued that to prohibit voluntary active euthanasia for mature minors 
would also be an unjustifiable violation of their right to dignity. Of course, the decision to die should 
be regulated by legislation to minimise abuse, but complete prohibition of the practice would be a 
violation of a terminally ill minor’s right to dignity.  
 
3.5.2 The right to life 
The right to life and the right to dignity are intertwined and cannot be easily separated. The right to 
life is more than just a right to mere ‘existence’ and it is suggested that the Constitution, although it 
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protects the right to life, it does not protect the ‘right to an existence that undermines a person’s right 
to dignity.’70 The following was stated in the Makwanyane71 case:  
“The right to life, thus understood, incorporates the right to dignity. So the rights to human 
dignity and life are entwined. The right to life is more than existence it is the right to be 
treated as a human being with dignity: without dignity, human life is substantially 
diminished.” 
This means that if one is not living a dignified existence, one’s right to life is also being infringed 
upon. In order to fulfil the right to life, given that it is interlinked with the right to dignity, the quality 
of life lived also needs to be assessed. A person who has a poor quality of life and undignified 
existence also, essentially, can argue that their right to life is being infringed upon as well. As was 
stated in the Stransham-Ford72 case, the right to life ‘cannot mean that an individual is obliged to live, 
no matter what the quality of his life is.’73 To suggest that the life must be preserved at all costs would 
be to misunderstand the right altogether. A mature minor who is suffering from a terminal illness will 
usually have a poor quality of life as their death nears. This means that their life is reduced to ‘mere 
existence’ and an existence which is undignified given that many people who suffer in their final 
stages of life are unable to wash themselves, complete basic tasks, are often highly medicated and 
unable to recognise family members and are suffering immense pain. This warrants the need for an 
option to end such a life if the patient so decides and in so doing, legislation will provide a person 
with the ability to end their life with dignity instead of preserving life at all costs.  
Those opposed to euthanasia argue that life is sacred and should not be interfered with. This idea 
stems from the religious/spiritual belief that life is sacred and that it is only God that can decide when 
it ends. This suggests that the state should not be able to allow for a person to request death because it 
would interfere with the sanctity of life doctrine. However, Dworkin argues that a life of indignity 
may actually be more of a violation of the sanctity of life than ending that life.74 
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In considering the concept of quality of life, it is determined by whether or not a person’s life is 
worthwhile to some extent in order to be meaningful.75 It is argued that if one is suffering from a 
terminal illness, it is often the case that one no longer has any quality of life which translates to a 
meaningless existence. Philosophers such as Glover and Harris submit that it is necessary to consider 
what quality of life a person has when considering end of life decisions – it is the person’s ability to 
have a pleasurable existence that denotes value or quality of life. 76 The quality of a person’s life is 
also subjective and is determined subjectively, just as a person’s belief that their dignity is being 
infringed upon can also be considered to be a subjective judgment.77 This essentially means that a 
person should be able to make their own decision that their life is no longer worth living. If a person is 
suffering in constant pain, such an existence cannot be considered to be a pleasurable one. By 
extension, this then means that such a person has no quality of life either. In such a case, provided a 
person is sufficiently competent to make such a decision, that person should be permitted to request 
death. 
One of the main aspects of the right to life is the right to be free from interferences that threaten life.78 
Every person has a right to act and make choices and the act of a person does not necessarily have to 
be to their benefit and it does not matter if other people think that the act in question is not for the 
actor’s good.79 In this sense, it is immaterial if other people think that a person should not continue 
living because he has a poor quality of life. Ultimately it is the choice of the man and if he wishes to 
continue living, no other person can interfere with his right to do so.80 
Although many people consider life to be sacred and it is often argued from a philosophical point of 
view that life is always preferable to death even if one is suffering, this should be a decision made by 
the individual himself. Bearing in mind that euthanasia is for the benefit of the individual, in some 
circumstances, a person is suffering a greater evil being alive than dead as in some situations life is so 
unbearable that it is better for the person to be dead.81 It is suggested that certain “minimum basic 
goods” that are supposedly required for a good life are: not being worked beyond one’s capacity, 
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having the support of family or community, is more or less able to feed oneself, one has hopes for the 
future, one has a place to lie down and rest at night.82 If a person is in extreme pain, struggles to eat 
without being nauseous and has no friends or family near, it could be argued that that person does not 
have an ordinary human life in the sense discussed above.83 In such a case the person should therefore 
be permitted to make the decision to end their life in a dignified manner. 
It is argued that if a person expresses his wish to be euthanized, in killing him, his right to life is not 
infringed. A person should be able to waive his right to life or to remove the duty of non-interference 
from others; hence another can end his life without reprehension.  It can be argued that permission 
given by a person is sufficient to remove the duty of non-interference from other people.84 This means 
that a minor, too, can decide to waive their right to life if they are suffering from a terminal disease 
that has rendered their quality of life poor and their existence meaningless.  
 
3.5.3 The right to bodily integrity 
S 12(2) of the Constitution provides the following:  
‘Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right - 
(a) to make decisions concerning reproduction; 
(b) to security in and control over their body 
(c) not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their informed consent.’ 
This right means everyone has control over their own body and what is done with it and supposes that 
a person is in the best position to make decision about their own body and that such decision making 
should not be interfered with as far as possible.85 This means that even if it is the opinion of others 
that your decision in respect of your body is not in your best interest, they are in no position to 
intervene.86  
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This right is often cited in respect of health care and the medical environment and is strongly linked to 
the right to autonomy. This right allows a person to refuse medical treatment if they wish to do so. In 
terms of the common law, a person who has the legal capacity to make decisions can decide to refuse 
treatment, even if such treatment is life-sustaining.87 The right to refuse treatment comes from the 
right to self-determination which encompasses the right to bodily integrity in terms of s 12 of the 
Constitution and is also linked to the doctrine of consent which acknowledges a person’s right to 
autonomy and to make decisions that affect them.88 The South African Guidelines for Good Practice 
in the Health Care Professions provides that a physician must respect a patient’s right to self 
determination.89 Of course the right to autonomy in respect of children is slightly different because it 
is acknowledged that a child’s right to autonomy may be limited to an extent in order to protect them 
from making decision which they do not fully understand.  
S 12(1) is also a noteworthy section. It provides that ‘Everyone has the right to freedom and security 
of the person which includes the right - (e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or 
degrading way.’ It is often argued that to prevent a person from making use of euthanasia or physician 
assisted suicide is essentially a means of treating them in a cruel, inhuman and degrading way because 
it is forcing them to suffer and to endure a life where, for instance, they cannot take care of their own 
personal hygiene and this can definitely be considered degrading. Rachels argues that there are 
instances where it may be “more humane,” albeit morally reprehensible, to kill a person than to allow 
him to die slowly.90 
Euthanasia offers patients a humane way out of suffering instead of forcing a person to continue to 
suffer until they die naturally.91 As was considered by the judge in the Stransham-Ford case,92 
humans consider it humane to euthanize animals that are suffering as provided for in s 2(1)(e) of the 
Animals Protection Act 71 of 1962 read with ss 5(1) and 8(1)(d).93 It is actually considered to be cruel 
to allow an animal to suffer if it is diseased, severely injured or in a condition such that to keep it alive 
would cause it unnecessary suffering. Not only is keeping such an animal alive considered to be cruel, 
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it is also a crime.94 Why this thinking is not translated to humans can be considered nonsensical. If it 
is considered cruel to allow an animal to continue to suffer, surely it is cruel to allow a human to do 
the same. People can make their own decisions and a decision to request euthanasia would need to be 
a voluntary one.95 Furthermore, the decision would need to be one which is made by a competent and 
sufficiently mature individual. Subjecting a person to suffering with no alternative can surely be 
considered inhumane and degrading treatment which could even be thought to be akin to torture.  
 
3.5.4 The right to privacy 
The right to privacy is also closely linked to the right to dignity and autonomy in that it entails a right 
to make decisions about one’s body without state interference.96  The Bernstein case defined the right 
to privacy as the “inner sanctum of personhood” which includes 
“family life, sexual preference and home environment, which is shielded from erosion by 
conflicting rights of the community.”97 In the National Coalition case, the court stated that the right to 
privacy includes the right to ‘a sphere of private intimacy and autonomy.’ 98 
In applying the abovementioned definitions of privacy, the court in the Teddy Bear case99 held that for 
the state to interfere with adolescent’s private sexual relationships was an intrusion into a “deeply 
personal sphere” of their lives100 which was impermissible. It was stated that “Privacy fosters human 
dignity insofar as it is premised on, and protects, an individual’s entitlement to a sphere of private 
intimacy and autonomy.”101 This decision relates specifically to adolescents and the principles can 
therefore be applied in respect of mature minors’ decision to be euthanized. Such a decision can also 
similarly be considered to be a decision that falls within a deeply private sphere of a child’s life.  
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In respect of end of life decision making, it could similarly be argued that for the state to prevent a 
mature adolescent from making a decision to die would be an unjustifiable infringement on his/her 
right to privacy. A decision to die is one of the most personal and private decisions a person can make 
and it can be argued that such a decision should be permissible provided certain safeguards are in 
place but that, given the right to privacy is also so closely linked to the right to dignity, that the state, 
by prohibiting a child from making an end of life decision, is forcing such a child to endure 
unbearable suffering until natural death and this is interfering with a deeply personal sphere of their 
life.  
 
3.5.5 The right to equality 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, passive euthanasia is permissible in terms of the common 
law yet voluntary active euthanasia is not. This means that if a person is suffering from a terminal 
illness and is on life sustaining machines or treatment may request that the machines be removed or 
the treatment be ceased and will then die a relatively quick death. However, another person who is 
suffering from a terminal illness but who is not on life sustaining machines, cannot end their life in 
any way because active euthanasia is not permissible, unless they commit suicide.102 It is argued that 
this could in fact constitute an unjustifiable infringement on the right to equality and would amount to 
unfair discrimination. In the American case of Quill v Vacco,103 the court stated that the New York 
law104 does not treat terminally ill patients equally in that  
“those in the final stages of terminal illness who are on life support systems are allowed to 
hasten their deaths by directing the removal of such systems; but those who are similarly 
situated, except for the previous attachment of life-sustaining equipment, are not allowed to 
hasten death by self-administering prescribed drugs.”105 
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In terms of the discrimination enquiry, if the discrimination is not based on a ground listed in section 
9 of the Constitution, then discrimination may still occur if it is on an analogous ground:  it is ‘based 
on attributes or characteristics which have the potential to impair the fundamental dignity of persons 
as human beings, or to affect them seriously in a comparably serious manner.’106 Further, it is 
considered to be an infringement of a person’s right to equality if they are treated as ‘less deserving of 
respect’ or their fundamental human dignity is undermined.107 It can be argued that for the law to 
allow for passive euthanasia to take place in respect of a terminally ill patient who is on life sustaining 
treatment but to not extend a similar right to die in the form of voluntary active euthanasia to another 
terminally ill patient, can be seen as an impairment of their right to dignity in a serious manner (See 
3.5.1.of this chapter). Following from this, to disallow voluntary active euthanasia can be seen as an 
unjustifiable infringement on a person’s right to equality.  
Even though it might be established that there is unequal treatment of people, it is further necessary to 
decide whether this unequal treatment is rationally connected to a legitimate interest of the state.108 In 
the case of Cuzan the court considered that perhaps the state’s interest is less when ‘the potential for 
life diminishes.’109 Surely this would mean that the state has less of an interest in sustaining life where 
it will end soon anyway. If this is the case, then there should be no prohibition of euthanasia but rather 
legislation allowing individuals to request euthanasia in a regulated manner. In the case of Quill v 
Vacco, the court concluded that in fact the law prohibiting a physician from prescribing lethal 
medication for a terminally ill patient to take is not rationally connected to a legitimate state 
interest.110 This reasoning could also be applied in South Africa where it can be argued that the 
prohibition of voluntary active euthanasia merely interferes with a very private decision of a 
terminally ill patient and is not rationally connected to a legitimate government interest. This means 
that it can be considered to be an unjustifiable infringement on the right to equality.   
It can also be argued that children are faced with discrimination on the basis of age in respect of 
legislation in other jurisdictions that permit some form of euthanasia but only for people over the age 
of 18. The South African Constitution specifically states in s 9 that no person may be discriminated 
against on the basis of age. The fact that there is also no legislation currently allowing minors to 
request euthanasia means that the only way a child would possibly be able to make such an end of life 
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decision would be to approach a court as was done by Mr Stransham-Ford.111 This would require a 
child to have assistance and financial support. This makes court generally not practically accessible 
for most children and for a child who is further suffering from a terminal illness, this task is near 
impossible. It is submitted that in the case of euthanasia, the limitation of a child’s autonomy (See 
3.5.3 above) in respect of end of life decisions is not justifiable as it merely dictates for how long a 
child must suffer instead of allowing that child to die with dignity.  
 
3.5.6 The right to healthcare 
In order to establish the meaning of health care, it is first necessary to define health. It is difficult to 
define health exactly but many definitions in law tend to indicate that health is more than a mere 
absence of disease but also includes a sense of well-being. The World Heath Organisation defines 
health as a ‘state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of 
disease or infirmity.’ 112 This is a broader social model rather than treating the body as a machine 
which malfunctions when ill.113 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that ‘everyone has the right to a standard 
of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care and necessary social services.’114  
It is suggested that health is ‘a dynamic state of wellbeing characterised by physical, mental and social 
potential, which satisfies the demands of a life commensurate with age, culture, and personal 
responsibility.’115 A person who does not experience wellbeing can be treated either biologically or an 
improvement of the ‘potential’ is required. Alternatively, it is often necessary to merely adapt or 
adjust the demands on a person.116 
The above tend to show that health includes more than merely the absence of sickness or disease. The 
use of the word wellbeing tends to indicate something more – a degree of happiness. LW Sumner’s 
authentic happiness theory, for instance, suggests that wellbeing entails authentic happiness wherein a 
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person is informed about the conditions of their life and they are also able to maintain autonomy 
instead of being oppressed or manipulated by society.117  
The degree of satisfaction that a person has with his/her life is also used as a measure of the wellbeing 
of an individual.118 There are many aspects to the concept of wellbeing but many authors indicate that 
autonomy, a sense of self determination and feeling as if one is living a life of purpose and meaning 
are all important in achieving wellbeing.119 A substantive theory of wellbeing for instance provides 
that happiness is a necessary, essential or perhaps even the only element of wellbeing.120 The formal 
theory of wellbeing proposed by Sumner provides that happiness is what makes something good for 
an individual and therefore happiness is necessary to achieve wellbeing: wellbeing only being 
achieved when something is good for the individual.121 
It appears that wellbeing, which is essential to general health includes a degree of happiness, self 
determination and a sense of purpose. A patient suffering from a terminal illness in most cases does 
not fulfil any of the above criteria for wellbeing. Furthermore, in most cases a patient suffering from a 
terminal illness does not consider their life to be meaningful nor can they describe their life as a happy 
one. This means that by forcing such a person to stay alive, that person’s wellbeing suffers. Anything 
that does not promote wellbeing cannot be healthcare. Conversely, it could then be argued that 
something which ends suffering could in turn be considered a promotion of wellbeing and by 
extension, a form of healthcare. If this is true, then euthanasia can be considered healthcare. 
In the case of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland122 Lord Keith stated that although there is a general duty on 
medical practitioners to keep patients alive, that duty does not extend to a situation where ‘a large 
body of informed and responsible medical opinion is to the effect that no benefit at all would be 
conferred by continuance’ of the treatment. Lord Wilkinson stated that doctors are only obliged to 
sustain life where it is in the best interests of the patient to be kept alive. Health care professionals 
have an obligation to ensure the welfare of their patients to the greatest extent possible; this is linked 
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to the bioethical principle of beneficence.123 This is also encompassed in s 28(1)(c) of the Constitution 
which provides that children have the right to basic health care services.  
The right to healthcare is centred around the patient’s best interests124 and if in cases where the patient 
is incapacitated it is permissible for the doctor to make a decision with regards to withholding 
treatment because such is in the best interests of the patient then surely a doctor should also act in 
allowing a terminally ill patient, adult or child, to end their life if it is in their best interests? If a 
doctor is the provider of healthcare when they withhold treatment in the interests of a patient, is it not 
then possible to also classify voluntary active euthanasia as healthcare?  
The relief of pain and suffering is considered to be healthcare specifically known as palliative care. 
Palliative care is aimed at reducing a person’s suffering but not necessarily to prolong their life. A 
doctor may administer pain medication to a terminally ill patient knowing that this medication may 
have the effect of shortening the patient’s life. This is known as the doctrine of double effect: the 
primary motive of the doctor is a good one and this is seen to outweigh the adverse, and known, effect 
of the medication ie shortening the life of the patient. In the case of R v Adams,125 the court stated that 
where a doctor cannot do anything more to improve the health of a patient, he may do what is 
necessary to relieve pain and suffering of the patient even if what he does ‘might incidentally shorten 
life by hours or even longer.’ Some consider forms of palliative care to be a form of euthanasia 
because the treatments involved often make subsequent death a foreseeable event. Palliative care 
deals only with physical and not mental pain and is therefore not an option for those who are 
dependent on life-sustaining machines.126 
The HPCSA ethical guidelines on withdrawal or withholding of treatment specifically state that if 
specialised care is ceased, a health care institution is obliged to provide appropriate palliative care.127 
Similarly, in the Patients’ Rights Charter, it provides that palliative care must be provided for patients 
suffering from an incurable or terminal illness.128 If palliative care and the administration of pain 
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medication, even that which shortens life, is considered to be health care, then it should follow that 
euthanasia is also a form of health care because it is a method of ending pain and is in the best 
interests of the patient. It could in fact be argued that euthanasia is merely a form of ending a patient’s 
suffering eternally and if every person has the right to healthcare which includes the right to receive 
medication to relieve pain and suffering, then every terminally ill person also has the right to receive 
medication to end their life.   
If euthanasia can be considered healthcare, this right should also be extended to children. It is true that 
not all rights are automatically extended to everyone, however, some rights should more readily be 
extended to children because they are considered to be vulnerable members of society. It could be 
argued that in the case of a patient suffering from a terminal illness, a child who is utterly desperate to 
end his/her life because they can no longer cope with the pain and suffering is less able to acquire the 
means necessary to commit suicide as opposed to an adult in that same situation. This furthers the 
argument that euthanasia should be permissible for children in such a position instead of condemning 
them to final months of pain and suffering.  
The Constitution provides that reasonable steps should be taken by the state towards progressive 
realisation of socio-economic rights. It should also be understood that such rights can only be 
achieved when taking into account the availability of resources. However, as can be seen in the 
Grootboom case,129 when socio economic rights of children are involved, there is a greater duty on the 
state to fulfil those rights because such rights are also stated in s 28 of the Constitution relating 
specifically to children. Section 28 of the Constitution does not include internal limitations as with 
other socio-economic rights in the Constitution where it is stated that such rights are subject to 
availability of resources and that there is only a duty on the state to progressively realise those rights. 
The rights envisaged in s 28 can therefore be considered to be ‘unqualified and immediate’ given that 
there is no internal limitation provided for in this section.130 In respect of healthcare, this means that 
the state has, arguably, a greater duty towards children to make provision for this right, subject only to 
reasonable and justifiable limitation of which euthanasia cannot be considered one. The reason that 
there exists a greater protection of rights in respect of children is because children are considered to be 
a vulnerable group of society and therefore require more protection.  
If the argument proffered above that euthanasia can in fact be classified as healthcare holds true, then 
given the greater protection and provision of rights in respect of children, it can be argued that in fact 
children have a greater claim to the right to die than adults do. To condemn a child to a life of pain 
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and suffering and to decline them the choice of ending such a life is akin to a deliberate decrease in a 
child’s health and wellbeing and surely such cannot be permissible where the right to healthcare is a 
right which should promote or protect wellbeing. Death can very often be seen as preferable to 
suffering and the decline in the welfare of a terminally ill individual who is forced to continue living.  
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Children should be seen as equal rights bearers to11 adults specifically in instances involving the right 
to dignity which is the right that informs all others and is the cornerstone of our democracy. The right 
to request euthanasia, or the right to die, is a right which should be afforded to a terminally ill minor 
provided that he is sufficiently mature and competent to make such a decision. To prohibit voluntary 
active euthanasia not only infringes a patient’s Constitutional rights, as was shown in the case of 
Stransham-Ford,131 but can also be seen to be contrary to bioethical principles in healthcare. As 
shown above, euthanasia can in fact be seen as healthcare. Children have a right to healthcare both in 
respect of s 27 and 28(c) and it can therefore be argued that terminally ill mature minors in fact have a 
right to euthanasia in terms of the Constitution. The intention of limiting children’s rights in many 
respects is to protect children from making decisions they do not fully understand. Further discussion 
on maturity and competence will follow the proceeding chapter. In respect of prohibiting voluntary 
active euthanasia, however, the prohibition is not a justifiable limitation of rights if the terminally ill 
minor in question is sufficiently competent to make the decision to die.  
 
                                                          




CHAPTER FOUR: CHILD AUTONOMY 
4.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter will consider the legislation in place specific to children in relation to decision making as 
well as the common law and legislation in respect of a child’s right to autonomy. It was established in 
the previous chapter that the Constitution provides for the right to bodily integrity, privacy, dignity 
and equality which all relate to children as well. The right to bodily integrity, privacy and dignity are 
intertwined and are key in determining how far a child’s right to autonomy extends. Certain rights are 
limited in terms of children in order to protect them from decisions they do not have sufficient 
capacity or maturity to make. The question is then, what about mature minors? It was submitted in the 
previous chapter that certain rights would be infringed if voluntary active euthanasia was not 
permitted but this chapter will focus more specifically on a child’s right to autonomy in order to show 
that a terminally ill mature minor’s rights are being unjustifiably infringed by the prohibition of 
voluntary active euthanasia for such a patient. 
4.2. Legislation  
4.2.1. Children’s Act 
Section 129 of the Children’s Act1 provides the following: 
(2)  A child may consent to his or her own medical treatment or to the medical treatment of his 
or her child if-   
(a)  the child is over the age of 12 years; and   
(b)  the child is of sufficient maturity and has the mental capacity to understand the benefits, 
risks, social and other implications of the treatment.   
(3)  A child may consent to the performance of a surgical operation on him or her or his or her 
child if-   
(a)  the child is over the age of 12 years; and   
(b)  the child is of sufficient maturity and has the mental capacity to understand the benefits, 
risks, social and other implications of the surgical operation; and   
                                                          





(c) the child is duly assisted by his or her parent or guardian. 
The requirements in s 129 acknowledge that age is not a requirement that alone can determine 
competence; maturity and mental capacity should also be assessed in order to determine whether 
consent given by a minor is informed consent.2 Given that the legislation specifically states that a 
child over the age of 12 may consent to treatment and to surgery (with the assistance of his/her parent 
or guardian) provided he/she is sufficiently mature and has the mental capacity to understand the 
implications of the treatment, it could be argued that such a child could also refuse treatment or a 
surgical operation if the same criteria are met. This impliedly provides an age at which a child can 
also refuse medical treatment or a surgical operation.3 Medical treatment as stated in the Act is wide 
enough to also encompass life sustaining treatment such as chemotherapy and this could also be 
refused by a child over the age of 12 who is competent to consent to treatment in terms of the Act.4 
Essentially, if a person has the legal capacity to consent to something, they also have the capacity to 
refuse it.5 There appears to be no logical reason why a higher standard of competence should be 
required for the refusal of treatment in comparison with consenting to it.6 The right to bodily integrity 
in terms of s 12 of the Constitution means that the South African courts are unlikely to override, at the 
request of the parents, the decision of a child to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, provided the 
child is competent to refuse such treatment.7The National Health Act also provides that a health care 
provider must explain to a patient that they have the right to refuse treatment and must further explain 
the implications, risks and obligations of the refusal.8 The concept of refusal of treatment or surgery 
could be extended to passive euthanasia: A child dying of a terminal illness who is on life-sustaining 
machines could request that the machines be switched off. Jurisprudence on the topic of euthanasia 
tends to indicate that active and passive euthanasia are morally no different (See chapter 2). The law 
appears to be anomalous in this regard as refusal of treatment which results in death is permissible. If 
a child is permitted to refuse treatment in line with the Children’s Act, then it could be argued that 
such a child should also be permitted to request euthanasia.  
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In respect of consent to medical treatment, it is necessary to ascertain whether a child is sufficiently 
mature enough to understand the nature of the medical treatment in question. In order to assess 
maturity, the reasoning ability of the child, the understanding that the child has in regard to the 
decision to be made as well as the voluntariness of the consent need to be assessed.9 The requirement 
of voluntariness is like any other in law – The consent must be informed and given without coercion 
of any kind. What is important to consider is the child’s reasoning ability – That is, the ability to 
reason logically and make a decision – and also the child’s understanding of the decision to be 
made.10 Factors such as age, intelligence, cognitive functioning and emotional functioning are to be 
considered in determining a child’s ability to reason and to make a decision.11 Hence, a child who is 
very young is often considered to be immature and cannot sufficiently reason, therefore being unable 
to make a decision in respect of his or her own medical treatment. The factors above are used in an 
enquiry as to the maturity of a child. The abovementioned factors provide guidance as to how 
maturity and competence can be assessed in children. In the case of a decision to die, it would be 
prudent for legislation on the matter to provide for assessment by a psychologist as well as a 
physician.  
Legislators felt that it would be possible for an assessment of maturity and mental capacity of children 
over the age of 12 to be carried out in order to decide whether such children could consent to medical 
treatment or medical surgery (if duly assisted by their parent or guardian). If such an assessment is 
deemed to be possible to carry out in respect of s 129, then it would surely also be possible for a 
medical practitioner and psychologist to assess the maturity and mental capacity of a terminally ill 
child who wishes to make use of euthanasia. If legislation were to be promulgated in respect of 
euthanasia and which allowed for children to make use of the practice, similar wording as is found in 
the Children’s Act could be used in that legislation. Such would act as a safeguard to ensure that 
children who are permitted to make use of the legislation are sufficiently mature to understand the 
implications of their decision. It would give children with sufficient mental capacity the right to 
exercise autonomy over their own body and also the opportunity of a dignified death rather than 
discriminating against them merely on the basis of age, regardless of maturity and mental capacity.  
There is increasing support amongst authors for an approach that does not apply a rigid age limit, 
especially in instances when a decision or action is extremely important. There is a great deal of 
criticism for a system that determines competence strictly according to age, especially in highly 
                                                          








personal matters that arise in the realm of health care.12 Research has shown that children are often 
able to make difficult decisions in regard to medical treatment and there are many instances in which 
a child may exceed adults in intelligence and discretion and so it is merely societal perceptions that 
dictate the difference between adults and children rather than actual differences in decision making 
abilities.13 It appears little respect is given to a child’s right to autonomy even if they have the same 
mental ability to understand the consequences of decisions yet if they were an adult their right to 
make an autonomous decision would be treated with importance.14 There is increasing support for the 
notion of a ‘mature minor’ and the legislation of many countries reflects the belief that there are 
instances where a minor may be sufficiently competent to make their own decision, although a child’s 
competence needs to be decided on a case by case basis.15 This reasoning supports the view that in a 
matter as personal and important as the decision to die, a mature minor should not be excluded from 
legislation merely because of age despite being sufficiently competent to make such a decision.  
In addition to s 129 of the Children’s Act, s 31 of the Act also provides that in all decisions which 
affect a child, the child should be consulted in the decision making process, considering the maturity 
level of that child. Section 10 of the Children’s Act also provides that a child of sufficient maturity, 
age and stage of development must be able to participate in any matter relating to them. This includes 
matters of health care. The purpose of such legislation is to ensure that parents do not abuse their 
parental responsibility rights.16 It is also necessary to acknowledge that children, if they are of 
sufficient maturity, should be able to make their own decisions, perhaps with the guidance of their 
parents. The law should not remove a child’s autonomy entirely from them. The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child17 also provides in article 12 that a child should be given the 
opportunity to express his/her views and to have such views taken into account depending on the age 
and maturity of the child.  These provisions simply bolster the view that, provided a child is 
sufficiently mature, he should be allowed to make his own decision, particularly in decisions which 
are very important and are of a highly personal nature.  
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There are other areas of the Children’s Act where children are permitted to make decisions about their 
own bodies and often parental consent is not even required. These provisions give children ‘absolute 
freedom to make personal decisions.’18  
(1) Virginity testing can only be performed on a child over the age of 16 if the child has 
consented to the testing in the prescribed manner and has been provided with counselling in 
relation to the testing.19 Furthermore, the results of the virginity test may only be disclosed 
with the child’s consent.20 
(2) The circumcision of male children may only be performed to a child over the age of 16 
provided he has consented to the procedure in the prescribed manner and has been provided 
with counselling.21 The only instance where circumcision may be performed on a child 
younger than 16 years is if it is performed for religious reasons in the manner prescribed or if 
it is for medical reasons and is recommended by a medical practitioner.22 
(3) A child over the age of 12 may be provided with contraception on request and no consent 
from the child’s parent or guardian is required.23 
These abovementioned provisions presuppose that a child may be competent to make certain 
decisions and reach a level at which they are capable of using their own discretion to make decisions 
which affect them.24 The above provisions show a willingness of the legislature to acknowledge 
children’s right to autonomy and their ability to make certain decisions that personally affect them. Of 
course the decision to die is the most important decision a person can ever make and therefore it is of 
the utmost importance that a child’s maturity and competence be correctly assessed. What the 
abovementioned legislation shows, however, is that very personal decisions in relation to a child’s 
body should be decided by that child. The decision by a terminally ill child to die is a decision which 
is also highly significance because refusing a child this choice condemns that child to a life of 
suffering and indignity until their natural death. It is therefore imperative that legislation be 
promulgated in order to promote the best interests of the child which in most instances, would be to 
allow a terminally ill mature minor to die.  
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4.2.2. Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act25 
 
This legislation is the only other law in South Africa which allows for a child to make her own 
decision regarding her body. According to this legislation, a child of any age may terminate her 
pregnancy without parental consent or control.  The medical practitioner or midwife who performs the 
abortion must advise a female minor to consult with her parents, guardian, family members or friends 
before taking the decision to abort but the medical practitioner/midwife may not refuse to carry out 
the abortion on the basis that family were not consulted.26 Despite the fact that the legislation does not 
prescribe a strict age limit at which a child can terminate her pregnancy, it is still the task of the 
medical practitioner to ensure that the child is capable of giving informed consent.27 If the child does 
not understand the risks, benefits, social and other implications of the termination of her pregnancy, 
then the consent given cannot be considered informed consent. This means that the level of maturity 
of a girl child who wishes to terminate her pregnancy also needs assessment in order to ensure that 
consent to the procedure is valid consent. This piece of legislation is another indication that the 
legislature considers it possible for maturity and competence of children to be assessed by medical 
practitioners and further, that children should be provided with the opportunity to make decisions 
about their own bodies.  
This legislation was challenged in the Christian Lawyers Association28 case on the basis that a girl 
under the age of 18 was not sufficiently competent to decide whether having an abortion is in her best 
interests or not without the guidance of her parents. The court stated that the legislation in question is 
based on the notion of informed consent and that no woman, regardless of her age, would be 
permitted to terminate her pregnancy if her consent to an abortion was not deemed to be informed 
consent. There are 3 legs to informed consent:29 
(1) Knowledge – A woman who terminates her pregnancy must have full knowledge of the 
nature and extent of the risk and harm involved in the procedure.  
(2) Appreciation – The woman must be able to appreciate the risk of harm or understand the 
nature and extent of the harm. 
(3) Consent – The woman must subjectively consent to the nature and extent of the harm and all 
the consequences that may arise from the procedure.  
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The court stated that it is constitutionally permissible for a child to be able to abort a foetus without 
parental consent because the legislation ‘is flexible to recognise and accommodate the individual 
position of a girl child based on her intellectual, psychological and emotional make up and actual 
majority.’30   
Essentially, this means that only a woman with the requisite mental capacity and understanding will 
be able to give informed consent, provided of course that she has full knowledge of the risk involved. 
This means that a child that is particularly young and immature will not fulfil the requirements for 
informed consent and will not be able to make the decision in any event.31 The legislation 
acknowledges that some children may be able to consent because they have sufficient emotional and 
intellectual capacity to understand fully to what they are consenting. The Act requires each individual 
to be assessed on a case-by-case basis by a medical practitioner to decide if she is sufficiently 
competent to make an informed decision to terminate her pregnancy without the assistance of her 
parents or guardian.32 
This legislation, as with the Children’s Act, acknowledges that it is possible to assess the maturity and 
competence of a child to make a decision about their own body and that the child’s decision should be 
respected if they are sufficiently mature. If the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act provides that 
a girl of any age can make the decision to terminate her pregnancy, provided that her consent is 
informed consent, then the same should be the case in respect of the decision to make use of 
euthanasia. It would obviously be necessary to assess each individual child on a case-by-case basis in 
order to establish whether consent to death is informed or not. The fact that a medical practitioner 
needs to assess a patient for mental and intellectual competence before they are permitted to make an 
end of life decision, would need to be incorporated into legislation to ensure that it is only minors who 
actually understand their decision who are permitted to make such a choice.  
 
4.3. Child autonomy 
 
The right to autonomy involves respect for an individual’s ability to make their own decisions. This 
encompasses a decision making process where the individual is assisted in making decisions and their 
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choices are thereafter respected.33 Patient autonomy is considered to be one of the ‘basic ethical 
principles’ relating to medical practitioners and is considered in the WMA Resolution on 
Euthanasia.34 The WMA Declaration on Terminal Illness35 also provides that patients should be 
allowed to make their own decision towards the end of their lives and such a decision should be 
respected although this does not mean that a medical practitioner is permitted to assist them in 
committing suicide.36 In order for a person to be able to exercise their autonomy, they need to be 
capable of making decisions which entails the ability to process and understand information related to 
the decision in question. This ability is acquired with age and maturity – Something which is different 
for every person.37 People who have cared for children who have chronic, debilitating conditions, 
however, often remark that these children have a higher level of maturity and are the only ones who 
fully understand their condition. In such situations, it may be the legitimate wish of the child to stop 
having life-saving treatment or to be euthanatized.38 In order to decide whether a person is capable of 
making a decision and understanding its implications, it is necessary for their maturity to be assessed 
and this is where a consideration of age comes into play. To assess every child’s maturity based 
entirely on their age is not a fair judgement to make. To do so would mean that children who are 
sufficiently competent as adults are not allowed to make decisions merely because they are under the 
age of 18.  
The Hippocratic Oath provides that a medical practitioner should always promote and advance the 
best interests of the patient but in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the World 
Medical Association guidelines; the medical profession is required to respect a patient’s autonomy 
and right to self determination.39 If a person is considered to be a rational moral being capable of 
acting in their own interests, a medical practitioner is required to respect such a person’s wishes and 
desires. Not to do so would be treating them as ‘less than human.’40 This would mean that a minor’s 
wishes should also be respected provided the child is considered to be capable of acting in his own 
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best interests. Chapter 3 of this dissertation provided a strong basis for the argument that disallowing 
voluntary active euthanasia is unconstitutional so if it can be shown that a terminally ill child is a 
sufficiently rational being, such a child should be permitted to request euthanasia.  
The right to autonomy is closely linked to the right to freedom. Although not expressly stated as such 
in the Constitution, the right to autonomy also includes the right to privacy and freedom, both of 
which are rights that are guaranteed to children. In some instances it may be argued that it is necessary 
to recognise a child’s right to autonomy because it shows a respect for the child’s right to self-
determination and promotes respect for a child’s dignity as a human subject rather than an object.41 In 
respect of health care there is a presumption that the person involved is the best person to make a 
decision in respect of their own body because they are the best judge of their present situation.42 
Generally, however, a minor’s competence cannot be presumed and must rather be proved.43 Provided 
a child can be shown to be competent, that child should be permitted to make a decision as important 
as the decision to end their own pain and suffering.  
Recognizing that children should have a right to autonomy and to make their own decisions does not 
mean that there are no serious risks attached to this. Some children are not emotionally or 
intellectually sufficiently mature to make adult decisions and the law still needs to protect these 
individuals.44 A child’s right to autonomy is often restricted in order to protect that child from making 
decisions they do not really understand. It is argued by many authors that children should not be given 
the same freedoms as adults because they are different from adults in that they are still developing, 
have less knowledge and skills and they are often dependent on adults.45 Children are often not yet 
capable of rational thought and should therefore be treated differently from adults for their own 
protection.46 It is generally accepted that particularly pre-adolescents have insufficient social 
experience and have not developed adequate intellect to be able to make decisions that have a major 
impact on their lives.47 Adolescents, however, have often developed cognitive abilities that may be on 
par with young adults. It can therefore be argued that setting a rigid age limit at 18 often does not take 
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into account that every individual is different.48 The concept of competence of a minor is not only 
associated with age but also rationality, mental ability and also the child’s own personal experiences.49 
For instance, a child that is suffering from a terminal disease such a leukaemia is in the best position 
to make an informed decision in respect of treatment because he/she has firsthand experience of the 
disease. It is, however, important to note that such experience only goes so far in determining 
competence and that other factors should also be considered. A young child may, for instance, have a 
good understanding of death but may not understand what the effect of death on their families will 
be.50 It could then be argued that such a child could not be considered sufficiently mature but rather 
lacking in competence to make a decision to end their own life through the use of euthanasia. It is 
certainly necessary that the law protect minors that are not sufficiently competent to make a decision 
about death, however, if an adult is permitted to make a decision to die currently in terms of the 
Constitution, a child capable of rational thought and understanding the consequences of their actions, 
should also be permitted to make such a decision.  
It is understandable that setting a rigid age limit at which children gain majority and can enjoy more 
freedom is a practical way of establishing control. It is impossible for a child’s individual maturity 
level to be assessed in respect of every decision in order to establish whether that child can understand 
the consequences of the decision. However, in respect of the decision to make use of euthanasia, such 
a decision is the most important one a person can make. In a case where a child is suffering from a 
terminal illness and is in incredible pain, such a decision should not only be allowed when the child 
reaches the arbitrary age of 18. A child of 17 years and 9 month might have sufficient maturity to 
make an end of life decision yet in most countries where Death with Dignity legislation exists, such a 
child is forced to suffer until they reach the age of 18. Foreign legislation will be considered in greater 
detail in the proceeding chapter but what is important to note at this stage is that such legislation has 
safeguards in place to ensure that a terminally ill patient is sufficiently competent to make an end of 
life decision. It could therefore be argued that if such an assessment can be carried out on an adult, a 
similar mental assessment could quite easily be carried out on a child as well in order to decide 
whether the minor is sufficiently competent to make the decision to opt for euthanasia.  
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4.4. Determining competence 
 
Determining competence of a child involves an assessment of the child’s maturity in order to ascertain 
whether the child can in fact make the decision in question. In respect of medical decisions, the degree 
of understanding a child has could be decided upon by ‘getting them to paraphrase their knowledge of 
the proposed treatment or procedure, their appreciation of the consequences of the proposed treatment 
or procedure, and their willingness to accept all the harm or risks involved in such treatment or 
procedure.’51 In order for a medical practitioner to establish whether a child is sufficiently competent, 
the following need to be shown:52 (1) The child can understand the information that they are provided 
with in respect of their condition. This also means that the doctor needs explain the information in an 
age-appropriate manner that the child can understand; (2) The child must believe and understand that 
the information in question applies to them specifically; (3) The child must be able to use the 
information provided to make a decision. Such decision must be made freely and voluntarily; (4) The 
child must then show the ability to make the particular choice. The idea of competence to make a 
decision involves more than just the child. It is also necessary to assess the relationships between 
child, parents and doctor as well as the surrounding circumstances. Furthermore, especially in a case 
of a child who is terminally ill, debilitating pain may reduce the child’s competence to an extent 
where such a child can no longer be considered competent to make a decision anymore.53 This 
problem also arises in respect of terminally ill adult patients. The above, however, provides solid 
guidelines as to how competence can indeed be established and shows that such should and can be 
done in respect of establishing whether a child is sufficiently competent to make an end of life 
decision.  
One of the key cases cited in respect of child autonomy in health care and assessment of maturity is 
the case of Gillick.54 In this case, a mother argued that the health care authority did not have the right 
to provide contraceptive advice and treatment to her daughter under the age of 16 without her 
consenting to it. The court did not find in favour of the mother and stated that the parental rights were 
in place in order to benefit the child but that they should not extend beyond what is necessary to fulfil 
their duties towards the child.55 This decision is an important one because the court concluded that a 
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child’s wishes should be given due weight.56 It was decided that a 16-year-old child has the requisite 
capacity and understanding to make a decision on a matter that affects him.57 
The decision in Gillick58 meant that if a child who is sufficiently mature to understand the 
implications of their decision consents to treatment, even if their parent or guardian does not consent, 
the child’s wishes should be respected. A child’s decision will only be overridden if the child is not 
considered to be sufficiently mature enough to understand the ramifications of their decision and are 
therefore not ‘Gillick competent.’ Such a test of maturity could also be carried out in order to decide 
whether a child is sufficiently competent to request death. 
It is of utmost importance to establish whether the consent of a child can be considered valid in that 
the child is sufficiently mature to understand the decision in question. In respect of adults, 
competency is also considered in establishing validity of consent. For instance, if a person is mentally 
ill, they will not be able to give valid consent. Similarly, competency of children to consent can also 
be established. A number of factors need to be considered in order to establish the capacity of a child 
to consent. The factors listed below are better suited to cases of consent to medical treatment or 
refusal thereof, but similar principles will also apply in respect of a decision to make use of 
euthanasia.59 
(1) Reasoning – A child must be able to reason in order to make a choice. The ability to reason is 
influenced by factors such as ‘age, intelligence, cognitive functioning and emotional 
functioning.’60 
(2) Understanding – This relates to the child’s understanding and knowledge of the problem. For 
instance, a child suffering from leukaemia has the best understanding of his/her own 
condition and also the treatment involved if he/she has previously been treated. If a child can 
give an informed opinion, it should be taken seriously. Part of being able to make an informed 
decision is also being exposed to all the relevant information. It is therefore necessary to 
ensure that a child is provided with all the necessary information in order to make the 
decision. In respect of an end-of-life decision, the implications need to be fully explained to a 
child and such a child needs to be assessed to determine whether or not that child is 
sufficiently mature to take the decision.  
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(3) Voluntariness – As with any consent given, the consent is not valid if the party consenting has 
been coerced or intimidated in any way. 
(4) The nature of the decision to be made – In respect of decisions regarding medical treatment, 
the benefits of the treatment are weighed up against its risks. Depending on the risk of harm 
associated with the procedure, different standards may apply. In a case where there is a high 
risk of harm occurring, it would be necessary to be extra careful in ensuring that the child is 
sufficiently mature to consent to the treatment. In the case of euthanasia, such a decision is 
fatal and is the most important decision anyone could make in their life. It is therefore 
necessary that the child is assessed properly for competency in order to establish whether 
he/she in fact has sufficient maturity to be able to reason and see the ramifications of making 
such a decision.  
Of course nobody can be considered fully competent to make a decision if they have not been 
provided with all the relevant information pertaining to the decision. In respect of information 
associated with the making of an informed decision, a couple of general guidelines need to be 
considered. Firstly, the quality of the information given to the child must be such that the child is able 
to understand the information fully.61 This means that it must be explained to the child in an age 
appropriate manner and in a language that the child understands. Culture and language may be 
problematic in respect of doctors having to provide information to a patient.62 Secondly, the minimum 
quantity of information to be provided is that which is necessary for a reasonable child to make an 
informed decision and there is a duty on the medical professional to answer all questions posed to 
him/her. If a child is not provided with sufficient information to make a decision, then the decision 
made is not considered to be an informed one and consent is not real.  
In respect of euthanasia, the above requirement would mean that a doctor would need to give the child 
all the information relevant to the process of dying in a manner that the child can fully understand and 
consent to. It would also mean an explanation of the implications of choosing to make use of 
euthanasia. The magnitude of a decision to die cannot be emphasised enough and therefore it is 
preferable that the decision made should be one which is made collectively by medical professionals, 
the parents (and possibly family of the child) and the child herself who is suffering from a terminal 
disease. Provided that the consent is valid in respect of the factors mentioned above and due 
consideration of the child’s ability to competently make a decision is given, which should be assessed 
by a child psychologist, then such a child should be permitted to request euthanasia. 
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It should be acknowledged that establishing the maturity and competence of a child is by no means an 
easy task. It is especially difficult if the child is a first-time patient of the practitioner and there has 
been scant time to establish a doctor-patient relationship.63 It is often argued that if there is little 
guidance for health care professionals with regards to establishing maturity and competence, then it 
may result in differential treatment of children.64 It would be advisable that those in the health care 
industry should receive training and support in order to help them to accurately measure a child’s 
level of maturity and whether or not they are sufficiently mature to make the decision.65 At the least, 
medical practitioners should apply the ‘principle of equity’ in that they do not hold children to a 
higher threshold of competence as adults.66 The principles mentioned above in this chapter do provide 
quite extensive guidance, however, to practitioners in terms of factors to consider when assessing 
competence and maturity. In respect of allowing a child to make such a big decision as the one to die, 
mistakes are irreversible. It is therefore necessary to ensure that legislation provides that a panel of 
medical staff should be involved in deciding on the maturity level and competence of the child in 
order to minimise the chance of error. Given that the assessment of maturity and competence also 
involves an analysis of a child’s cognitive development in general, it would be advisable that a child 
psychologist also indicate that he/she believes that the child is in fact sufficiently mature and 
competent to opt for euthanasia.  
 
4.5. Best interests of the child principle 
 
In respect of treatment, the choice to die and indeed many other decisions that are taken in respect of a 
child, the ‘best interests of the child’ are always of paramount importance.67 In addition to the 
provision in the Constitution, s 9 of the Children’s Act also provides that “in all matters concerning 
the care, protection and well-being of a child the standard that the child’s best interest is of paramount 
importance, must be applied.”68 What is in contention is whether it is indeed in the best interests of a 
child to die, should they request euthanasia. Certain factors are taken into account when determining 
the best interests of the child including the child’s “age and cognitive level, his or her physical, 
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emotional and educational needs and desires, as well as his or her cultural belief system and social 
environment.”69 It is necessary to acknowledge that emotional, medical and all welfare issues in 
respect of the child help to determine what is in the child’s best interests and these best interests 
ensures the best outcome for a child, not necessarily the most reasonable outcome.70 The wishes of a 
child will be overridden when their decision is considered not to be in their best interests and they are 
not sufficiently mature to make such a decision. In the case of Re M,71 the mother of 15 year old child 
consented to the child having a heart transplant but the child refused to have the operation. The court 
in that case overruled the child’s decision. Similarly, in the case of Re W,72 the court did not permit a 
16 year old from refusing life sustaining treatment for anorexia. The reason why these decisions were 
reached is because it was considered to be in the child’s best interest in both circumstances to receive 
the requisite treatment. The abovementioned cases, however, do not involve terminally ill children 
who have no prospect of recovery. It cannot be considered to be in the child’s best interests to 
continue to suffer until death and live a poor quality life. In such a case, it can easily be argued that 
euthanasia is an alternative which is in the best interests of the child.   
Of course, a child should always be viewed as being part of a family and so the views of the parents 
and perhaps family need to also be taken into account.73 Especially in the case of euthanasia, it is most 
definitely a decision that requires considerable input from other parties because it is ultimately the 
biggest decision a person can make – To end their own life. It should be understood that children 
cannot be completely isolated from their parents and that it is often true that a parent is in the best 
position to understand the best interests of their own child and to make a decision in that respect. In 
the case of Re C (HIV test),74 Wilson J stated that the views of parents were definitely important and 
that regardless of what the underlying reasons for their views are, they are in a good position to decide 
on the welfare of their child. Parental consent should perhaps be a prerequisite before any request of 
euthanasia is carried out. The question then often arises though – What if a parent refuses to give 
consent for the child to end their own life and yet the child continues to suffer? In such a situation it 
would then be possible for the child to approach a court and gain an order which overrides the 
parent’s lack of consent if the child is considered to be sufficiently mature to make the decision and it 
is in the best interests of the child for his wishes to be carried out.  
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Despite parents playing a key role in the decision making of their child, the best interests of the child 
are always of paramount importance regardless of the wishes of the parents. In cases where parental 
consent is required for a child to undergo a medical procedure, there have been a number of cases 
where a court has ordered that, for instance, a child receive a blood transfusion where the parents had 
refused to consent to the procedure on religious grounds.75 However, there appears to be little or no 
jurisprudence on what would happen if a child refuses treatment. In the foreign case of A.C v 
Manitoba,76 the child’s decision to refuse treatment was overridden as it was considered to be in the 
best interests of the child to get treatment. However, given the provisions of the Children’s Act that a 
child must consent to a procedure, it could follow that a child is also permitted to refuse a medical 
procedure and be able to argue successfully based on his/her rights to bodily integrity in terms of the 
Constitution, and that it is in their best interests to die. If the child is permitted to refuse treatment then 
it should also follow that such a child should be able to request active euthanasia (See discussion on 
the artificial difference between active and passive euthanasia in chapter 2). 
There are instances already in society where doctors will recommend that treatment not be given to a 
person if their diagnosis is such that there is no prospect of recovery. Infants who suffer from mental 
or physical defects are also frequently deliberately left to die. The question in such cases is whether 
the decision is for the benefit of the child or whether it is the parents/family that the doctor has in 
mind when the decision is made. It is often genuinely for the benefit of the child in cases of severe 
disability where life-prolonging treatment is not given. The rationale behind a decision to do the 
above is to save the child from a life of immeasurable suffering.77 If this is considered to be morally 
permissible, then surely it could be considered to be in the best interests of a child to grant a request 
for euthanasia if the child is terminally ill in order to prevent unnecessary suffering. 
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S 7 of the Children’s Act78 sets out criterion for determining what the best interests of the child are. 
Section 7 is a closed list which means that the court cannot apply its own factors outside of this list. 
This has been severely criticised on the basis that it is a “pre-determined formula.”79 In the case of s v 
M, the Constitutional Court held that to apply a pre-determined list is not actually in the best interests 
of the child.80 It is preferable that the court considers all relevant factors applicable to the case in order 
to determine the best interests of the child.81 It is necessary to determine whether something is in the 
best interests of a child on a case by case basis and law must be flexible to allow for the best interests 
to be decided according to the facts at hand.82 
Competent adults are generally able to make decisions which may even be considered irrational or to 
their detriment.83 A child who makes the same decision, even if they are sufficiently competent to 
make such a decision, will not be treated in the same manner. The child’s decision will be scrutinised 
and it will be considered whether that decision is a rational one or not and in the child’s best interests. 
The emphasis on rationality tends to promote the prolonging of a child’s life, regardless of its quality 
and this overshadows the child’s right to autonomy.84 This is understandable given that the law is 
expected to protect children from making bad decisions, but what are the best interests of a child 
when it comes to a terminally ill child who is suffering? Surely if such a child can understand their 
choice to die, they should not be denied that choice merely because of their age. In any event, it can 
be argued that it is a violation of that child’s rights and therefore it is in fact in that child’s best 
interests to respect their decision. There is also a case for euthanasia of a terminally ill child being in 
their best interests because their quality of life is poor and they are suffering. In many instances, a 
newborn who is deformed for instance will be left to die by doctors because it is considered not to be 
in the best interests of that child to live a life of suffering. In a case where a mature minor actually 
requests euthanasia because of the immense pain they are in, it can surely be seen to be in their best 
interests for the request to be carried out in order to end their suffering.  
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The Belgian legislation permits a child to request euthanasia provided the child has decisional 
capacity to make that decision, meaning that the child must be sufficiently mature to understand their 
request for death.85 The Dutch legislation, similarly, allows for children over the age of 12 to request 
euthanasia.86 The legislation provides certain safeguards in respect of children which are expected to 
minimise abuse of the practice. This legislation acknowledges a child’s right to autonomy while still 
ensuring maximum protection. Euthanasia is always seen as a last resort but legislation in these 
foreign jurisdictions provides a child with the option to request death when suffering is unbearable 
and the minor wishes to die with dignity, provided he or she is sufficiently mature to make the 




Legal framework should reflect both adults and children’s’ rights in respect of death. As advocated 
throughout this dissertation, legislation should be promulgated in order to allow terminally ill patients 
to request euthanasia and should also allow for mature minors to make use of the practice provided 
they are sufficiently competent to make such a decision. The Children’s Act already reflects the 
willingness of legislators to allow mature minors to make their own decisions about their body. Both 
the Children’s Act and the National Health Act impliedly allow for a mature minor to refuse medical 
treatment which essentially means that passive euthanasia is permissible for such a minor and 
following from this should also allow for active euthanasia given that the distinction between the two 
forms is essentially artificial. The legislation also provides that maturity and competence need to be 
ascertained before a child can consent to or refuse medical treatment and such is decided on a case by 
case basis. A similar approach could be employed in respect of euthanasia and assessing whether a 
minor is competent to make the decision to die. The final factor to consider in respect of children is 
the best interests of the child. A solid argument can be made for the notion that a life of pain and 
suffering is not a quality life and to force a child to continue to suffer is not in that child’s best 
interests. Ultimately, it is in the best interests of a mature minor to make a decision in respect of their 
own body provided they understand the decision sufficiently. In disallowing a request for euthanasia, 
such a minor’s rights are being unjustifiably infringed which can never be in a child’s best interests. 
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This chapter will contemplate the legislation in respect of euthanasia in two other jurisdictions: 
Belgium and the Netherlands. The reason why these specific countries have been chosen is because 
they allow children to make an end of life decision, that is, to request euthanasia, provided they are 
sufficiently mature and competent to make such a decision. Dutch law is of specific importance in 
relation to South African law given that South African law is based on Roman-Dutch law. The 
Belgian euthanasia law was extended in 2002 to allow for minor’s to request euthanasia if they are 
suffering from a terminal illness in respect of which there is no prospect of recovery and the minor in 
question is suffering great pain. The legislation places no age limit on a patient who can request 
euthanasia although certain additional safeguards have been adopted in order to protect children. The 
legislation in the Netherlands provides that only children over the age of 12 may request euthanasia 
and consent of their parents is required up to the age of 16. Both of these jurisdictions, therefore, show 
a willingness to acknowledge the need for a child who is terminally ill to make the decision to die and 
that such a child’s right to autonomy should be respected. In addition to the Dutch and Belgian 
legislation, this chapter will also consider the South African Law Commission Draft Bill which 
proposes euthanasia legislation for implementation in South Africa. Provided that procedural 
safeguards are put in place to ensure minimal abuse of the practice, legislation which promotes a 
mature minor’s right to choose death should they meet the requirements should indeed be 
implemented.  
5.2 Belgium  
 
The Belgian euthanasia law had been in place for over a decade before it was decided by the 
legislators that the law should be extended to allow for children to also make use of the law. The 
Belgian law on euthanasia came into effect in 2002 but it was only in 2014 that the law was extended 
to allow for a person of any age to request euthanasia.1 This was in line with concerns that there were 
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also minors who were suffering from terminal illnesses and had no option to die.2 The legislation was 
promulgated with the view and acknowledgement that despite modern pain relief medication, children 
may still suffer pain and distress and should in some instances be permitted to end their life in 
accordance with the legislation.3 
Prior to the enactment of the Belgian legislation, a survey conducted revealed that 69% of physicians 
who dealt with Belgian children were in favour of allowing minors to request euthanasia as well.4 The 
survey also revealed that 60% of the physicians surveyed, thought that parental consent should be 
required in terms of a minor making an end of life decision.5 The study carried out showed that 
physicians also believed that it was possible for the decision making competence of a child to be 
correctly assessed so that only those children who are sufficiently mature to make an end of life 
decision would be permitted to do so.6 A similar acceptance by physicians of euthanasia for minors 
was also found and it is believed that this acceptance stems from there appearing to be no significant 
abuses of the euthanasia law that was in place prior to the extension of the law to include minors.7 
This information in respect of physician’s attitudes is interesting to note given that physicians are 
trained to heal and often have a negative attitude towards the practice of euthanasia. The acceptance 
of euthanasia by the majority of doctors indicates that there is a strong feeling that euthanasia should 
be permitted in certain circumstances where there is no prospect of the child recovering and where 
such a child is suffering pain unnecessarily.  
 
5.2.1 Legislative safeguards 
The Belgian legislation stipulates additional safeguards in respect of children who request euthanasia 
in order to try and minimise abuse. A terminally ill child who wants to request euthanasia must make 
an explicit voluntary request free of coercion on a number of occasions.8 The request must also be in 
writing and the child in question must be suffering from a terminal disease with no prospect of 
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recovery. 9 In addition, the law makes provision for a multidisciplinary team which assesses the 
competence of the child in order to ensure that the child has decisional capacity and that euthanasia 
appears to be the best option for the child in the circumstances.10 The multidisciplinary team consists 
not only of medical doctors but also of a child psychologist or psychiatrist that can make an accurate 
assessment of the child’s decision making capacity.11 It is prescribed that in addition to parental 
consent, three separate doctors would also need to agree with the decision to allow the request for 
euthanasia to be carried out.12 The fact that it is a prerequisite that the child be of sufficient capacity to 
make the end of life decision means that patients who are mentally ill or very young are automatically 
excluded from being able to make a decision to die.13 The doctor must also explain the alternatives 
available to the patient, for instance the possibility of palliative care.14 These safeguards are intended 
to minimise abuse and to ensure that euthanasia is only permitted in circumstances where the 
requirements are fulfilled.  
In addition to the safeguards mentioned above specifically relating to children, the legislation also 
provides that a physician must ensure that the consent given is not coerced consent and that the 
request for euthanasia is given repeatedly.15 The physician must also explain the patient’s condition to 
him/her and be sure that there appears to be no alternative treatment for the patient in the 
circumstances.16 The physician must be sure that the patient is in a state of constant and unbearable 
suffering and must consult with another physician who must agree on the degree of suffering the 
patient is in and must also agree that the patient’s condition is incurable.17 In the event that the 
physician believes that the patient will not die very soon, he is expected to consult with a second 
physician or a psychiatrist or specialist in the illness from which the patient is suffering and to inform 
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this practitioner of the patient’s condition and the second practitioner must confer with the first that 
the patient is suffering unbearable and constant pain.18 The request for euthanasia must be in writing 
and must be signed by the patient. In addition, there must be at least one month between the request 
being made and the act of euthanasia being performed by the practitioner.19 The extent of these 
safeguards indicates that the intention behind the legislation is only to provide the option of death in 
instances firstly, where a patient has a disease that is incurable and the prognosis has been confirmed 
and secondly, where the patient is suffering. It must be emphasised that euthanasia is intended to be a 
last resort rather than simply as a result of a decision made on a whim.   
The Belgian legislation is progressive in that it recognises a person’s right to autonomy and to make a 
decision to die, regardless of age. Rather than the law stipulating the age at which a person is 
sufficiently mature to request euthanasia, the legislature has instead opted for an approach that allows 
for any person, regardless of age, to make such a decision provided that the abovementioned 
requirements stipulated in the legislation are fulfilled.20 The requirements stated in the legislation 
essentially provide that a person must fully understand the decision they are making and this will 
exclude young children anyway because a child who is insufficiently mature to understand the 
seriousness of the decision to die will be excluded from requesting euthanasia. The extensive 
safeguards adopted in the legislation also provide for some form of psychological assessment of the 
patient in order to ensure that the patient is sufficiently competent and mature to make the decision to 
die. This means that the legislation provides only that a child who is sufficiently mature and has 
decisional capacity to make the decision to die can make such a decision and will not be forced to 
suffer unbearable pain until the occurrence of their natural death.  
The Belgian Euthanasia Act also makes provision for the establishment of the Federal Control and 
Evaluation Commission which is a body that investigates instances of euthanasia reported.21 If it 
appears that the procedures and conditions in respect of euthanasia that are stipulated in the Act are 
not adhered to then the commission will hand the case over the public prosecutor having jurisdiction 
in the area where the transgression occurred.22 The legislation, therefore, creates a process whereby 
the decision of a physician can be questioned and those who transgress the provisions of the 
legislation will be prosecuted and penal sanction will follow.  
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The Belgian legislation provides that parents must agree to their child’s decision to request euthanasia 
and prior to the decision making, the parents must obviously be consulted.23 The provision requiring 
parental consent has been included in the legislation in order to provide additional protection for 
children and to ensure that the decision taken is the correct one. It is often suggested that the 
involvement of parents in crucial in the decision making process as parents are generally in a good 
position to be able to understand their child’s needs and provide valuable insight. It is, however, 
argued that in fact the inclusion of parental consent in the legislation simply means that the parent’s 
perception of what is hopeless and unbearable suffering is adopted, the result of which is not a true 
reflection of the child’s perception and there is even further chance that a child may be influenced by 
their parents. This, to an extent, is a legitimate criticism. However, the multidisciplinary team 
involved in granting the request for euthanasia should in fact ensure that the decision made by the 
child is that of the child herself and not merely the decision of her parents. This is why it is 
particularly necessary that a child psychologist sit on the multidisciplinary team in order to assess the 
child’s decision making capacity and to ensure that the decision is in fact what the child wants, 
bearing in mind that ultimately the best interests of the child are of utmost importance.24 
 
5.2.2 Criticisms and counter-arguments 
 
There are always concerns that the decriminalisation of euthanasia will result in many more cases of 
patient euthanasia, often in circumstances where vulnerable members of society are coerced into 
consenting to death as an alternative to palliative care.25 This is known as the ‘slippery slope’ 
argument but studies in Belgium and the Netherlands do not confirm the slippery slope hypothesis.26 
There may in fact be more reported cases of euthanasia in both countries but this is merely because it 
is now legal and so more cases have been reported where previously they were kept undercover by 
physicians who feared prosecution.  
Furthermore, the precise conditions that are stipulated in the legislation are to an extent criticised. The 
legislation provides that a child must be in a state of “constant and unbearable suffering” and their 
medical condition must be “futile” in that the patient is suffering from an incurable illness or 
disease.27 This is the same standard that is adopted in respect of adults requesting euthanasia. This 
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standard is criticised and considered to be problematic because it is difficult to define what exactly the 
phrase “constant and unbearable suffering” actually means. There is no objective standard to ascertain 
whether a person would be able to fall within this category.28 It is further argued that even if a patient 
can in fact identify the extent of their pain and suffering, such a patient suffering from a terminal 
illness may not be able or competent to voice this.29 In opposition to the abovementioned criticism of 
the legislation, it is submitted that “constant and unbearable suffering” is something which can 
subjectively be determined and voiced by a patient. If a patient is in a situation of constant suffering 
and voices this, it could be considered as sufficient to fulfil the criteria in terms of the legislation. 
Furthermore, although perhaps medics cannot determine the precise subjective suffering of a patient, 
there are ways to monitor and determine pain from a physiological point of view as the body will 
react in certain specific ways when in severe pain. From a physician’s knowledge and understanding 
of pain management for terminally ill patients, such a physician could be in a position to make an 
educated judgement with regards to whether or not a patient is suffering unbearably or not. This, in 
conjunction with the patient’s request, should be sufficient to fulfil the criterion in terms of 
legislation.  
Many authors agree that the alternative of palliative care should always be offered and explained to a 
patient prior to their request for euthanasia being granted.30 The physician must explain the patient’s 
diagnosis to them and present the patient with alternative therapeutic measures as well as the 
possibility of palliative care.31 The problem is that in many countries, and indeed South Africa, 
palliative care is often not seen as a very viable option because it is not sufficiently understood and is 
not adequately funded.32 In many instances it is also argued that palliative care does not go far enough 
in relieving pain and suffering and that there comes a stage where a child can be in such a desperate 
position that he or she would want to request death if it is legal in order to end his or her unbearable 
suffering.33 Friedal argues that instead of the law in Belgium allowing for minors’ requests for 
euthanasia to be carried out, the palliative care law should be extended to allow for children to also 
receive high quality palliative care and for there to be more discussion and policy centred on 
improving the psychological, mental and physical aspects of palliative care for both the child and his 
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or her family.34 Similarly, Siegel also argues that adequate palliative care should be provided for 
children instead of euthanasia, although that author acknowledges that quality palliative care is not 
available in many countries.35  
The above approach is not one that is particularly viable in a developing country such as South Africa 
where medical facilities are already under resourced. Palliative care can indeed be seen as preferable 
in some cases, although in an underdeveloped country such as South Africa, medical resources are 
more readily allocated to patients who have a prospect of recovery rather than those who are 
terminally ill.36 This means that many South Africans who are terminally ill may not even have access 
to any form of pain relief or palliative care simply because hospitals are under resourced. In such 
instances, a patient may have to suffer until death without a proper pain management regime. Where 
this is the case, such a patient should be provided with the opportunity to request euthanasia and end 
their suffering should they wish to do so. Legislative provisions merely provide patients with an 
alternative option; they do not advocate the practice as a solution in all cases. In every case of a 
request for euthanasia, all the requirements listed in the legislation must be fulfilled and so if a patient 
is coerced into requesting euthanasia such a request should in any event not be granted.  
The Belgian euthanasia legislation is further criticised by Siegel on the basis that it does not take into 
account that adults make a decision to die for different reasons to children.37 For instance, adults may 
fear a loss of dignity and control and do not want to be a burden on family members, which it is 
argued are not the same reasons that a child would opt for euthanasia.38 Siegel argues that children do 
not have the requisite knowledge or intellectual ability to be able to choose euthanasia categorically 
over palliative care.39 Although it can easily be agreed that a young child may lack the competence 
and decisional capacity to make an end of life decision, the difference between a 17 year old and 18 
year old is surely minimal. A child or adult would need to be assessed individually when a request for 
euthanasia is made and therefore even an adult who is particularly immature would not be able to 
make an end of life decision just as a 16 or 17 year old child may certainly be sufficiently mature and 
competent to make an end of life decision. The Belgian Euthanasia Act, prior to amendment in 2014, 
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provided that any person requesting euthanasia must be found to have the ‘capacity of discernment’ 
before such a request could legally be granted.40 A similar approach would then be used in assessing 
the competency of children who request euthanasia rather than strictly applying age restrictions which 
do not necessarily correspond with the competency of a child to make an end of life decision.41 If a 
terminally ill child requesting euthanasia is found to be sufficiently mature for ‘discernment’ then 
such a child’s request should be granted.42 As the decision is such an important one, each individual 
needs to be assessed on a case by case basis in order to ensure that that particular person is sufficiently 
competent to make the decision. Regardless of whether the individual in question is an adult or child, 
the assessment should still be conducted with meticulousness. 
The Belgian law is also criticised on the basis that the type of drugs that should be used for euthanasia 
are not stipulated in the legislation which may have different effects on patients and may in fact not 
result in a peaceful death for some.43 It is suggested that the type of drugs to be used by a physician 
who carries out a request for euthanasia should be stipulated in the medical professionals’ ethical 
guidelines publication if not in legislation.44 It has also been argued that the law provides too much 
room for abuse in that the legislation even allows for a person with a mental condition to request 
euthanasia.45 This dissertation does not extend to the consideration of euthanasia in case of mental 
illness. It is preferable for euthanasia to only be permissible in instances where a patient is suffering 
from a physical illness which is easily identifiable by a physician.  
One of the main arguments against euthanasia legislation is the so-called ‘slippery slope’ argument 
which presupposes that enactment of legislation will result in an increase in cases of euthanasia and 
the law will be relaxed even further to allow for other vulnerable groups to make use of the practice as 
well.46 For instance, it appears that in the Netherlands, the law has been substantially relaxed to the 
extent that patients are now being euthanized for psychiatric disorders instead of merely physical 
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ailments.47  This is why it is necessary that the legislation be well drafted and provides adequate 
safeguards to ensure minimal abuse. It is also imperative that those who transgress the law be 
prosecuted and convicted. As was shown in chapter two of this dissertation, in instances where a 
physician assisted a patient to die, the physician is generally handed a suspended sentence. The 
implementation of euthanasia legislation should provide that those who transgress the provisions 
therein are held criminally liable for their actions and the courts should thereafter follow with a 
punitive sentence.  
In opposition to the above slippery slope argument, it has been said that countries which have enacted 
euthanasia law have fewer instances of euthanasia without the consent of the patient as opposed to 
those countries whose laws allow for a person to legally request euthanasia.48 Many doctors in 
Belgium have suggested that in fact the enactment of the new euthanasia laws in that country have not 
increased the number of patients dying as a result of euthanasia but rather that physicians have instead 
been able to carry out legal mercy killings as opposed to doing such illegally.49 It is argued that the 
‘slippery slope’ argument is confirmed with reference to the substantial increase in the number of 
patients in Belgium who have opted for euthanasia to cause death.50 This does not, however, 
necessarily mean that there is abuse of the practice, although many people tend to jump to this 
conclusion automatically. Instead it may simply mean that more people are exercising their rights and 
deciding to be euthanized when they are terminally ill. It also means that these deaths are reported and 
recorded whereas prior to legislation, if a person was euthanized it was illegal and the true cause of 
death was not reported. The study referred to in the Chambaere article, indicates that along with an 
increase in the requests for euthanasia, there also appears to be more willingness on the part of 
physicians to comply with the statutory provisions of the Euthanasia Act.51 
Since the extension of the Belgian law to include children as well, there has only been one case of a 
terminally ill minor being euthanized.52 The fact that in 2 years there has only been one case shows 
that there are actually very few cases of terminally ill children who wish to make use of the euthanasia 
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legislation. It also shows that the so called ‘slippery slope’ argument is a fallacy. Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that children should not also be permitted to die with dignity and end their suffering if 
they wish to do so.53 The decision of a patient to die with dignity when one is terminally ill is of such 




In terms of the law in the Netherlands, euthanasia is the practice of a physician administering 
medication to the patient, at the request of the patient, with the intention of causing death.54 The 
legislation provides that the physician attending to the patient who requests death must be sure that 
the consent given is ‘voluntary and well considered.’55 The patient’s suffering must be ‘lasting and 
unbearable’ and there must appear to be no alternative to the patient in the circumstances.56 In order to 
try and minimise abuse, the Act further provides that the physician must inform the patient of all the 
medical alternatives available to him so that he can then make an informed decision and further, an 
independent doctor must be consulted before the request can be granted.57 These safeguards are 
virtually identical to those provided for in the Belgian legislation discussed above. The common 
thread running through the legislation is that it is always necessary that more than one physician agree 
to grant the request for euthanasia and that these physicians must ensure that the patient is suffering 
from a terminal illness and is in unbearable pain. It is essential that these doctors ensure that the 
patient’s situation is futile. Furthermore, it is essential to ascertain that the patient’s request for 
euthanasia is given voluntarily and that it is in fact the wish of the patient to die.  
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5.3.1 Dutch legislative safeguards 
 
In the Netherlands, the Euthanasia Act58 provides that a minor over the age of 12 can request 
physician assistance to die or request euthanasia but only with the consent of his/her parents.59 A child 
over the age of 16 does not require the consent of his/her parents but does require parental 
assistance.60 In both events above, the minor’s ability to understand his interests must always be 
assessed before the decision to die can be granted.61 The legislation specifically stipulates that a minor 
must have ‘reasonable understanding of his interests’ in order for that child to be considered 
competent and for their request for euthanasia to be granted.62 This indicates an assessment of a 
child’s competence to make such a decision before allowing for the request to be granted.  
The Dutch legislation places a strong emphasis on family involvement in the decision to die. This is 
can be seen specifically in respect of the legislation as it relates to minors. Unlike the Belgian 
legislation, the Dutch legislation provides that a minor between the age of 12 and 16 must attain 
parental consent before the request for euthanasia may be granted. Despite it being imperative the 
decision made by the patient is ultimately a voluntary one, it is suggested that it is important that the 
decision to opt for euthanasia should be extensively discussed with the patient and/or family or 
relatives.63 It is also implied that a similar approach should be adopted in respect of palliative care 
measures such as palliative sedation.64 Although the law on euthanasia should provide patients with 
the option to die, it should never allow for people to be euthanized without their explicit and 
uncoerced consent. To allow for such would be unethical and unlawful.65 The Dutch legislation 
attempts to provide safeguards in order to minimise abuse and to prevent the vulnerable from being 
coerced into consenting to death while at the same time allowing for people to make an end of life 
decision and to die with dignity.  
Following the enactment of euthanasia legislation, there always appears to be concern that the number 
of deaths in the country will increase unnecessarily as a result of the practice being legally permitted. 
Studies show that after the enactment of the Dutch euthanasia legislation, however, there was a 
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decrease in the number of deaths resulting from euthanasia or physician assisted dying, mainly 
attributed to greater reliance on end-of-life care such as palliative care and continuous deep sedation.66 
Studies have also shown that there does not appear to be abuse of the vulnerable in euthanasia cases.67  
The Dutch legislation, in a similar way to the Belgian Euthanasia Act, also provides for the 
establishment of a review committee.68 The committee analyses the terminations of life on request and 
investigates instances where it appears that the attending physician has not taken due care in terms of 
the Act.69 In a case where it is suspected that the physician has not followed the prerequisite due care 
requirements, the case may be handed over to the public prosecutor for criminal prosecution of the 
physician.70 The committee also has the function of reporting cases in which life has been terminated 
on request by the patient in terms of the Act.71 This is a particularly necessary feature of the 
legislation as it makes provision for penal sanction should the requirements as stipulated in the 
legislation not be fulfilled and a request be granted nevertheless.  
5.4 Proposed South African legislation 
 
As considered previously in this dissertation, specifically in chapter 2, South African law does not 
permit any form of voluntary active euthanasia at common law level and there is currently no 
legislation enacted in order to allow for or regulate the practice. The South African Law Commission 
drafted a report and proposed legislation regulating the practice of voluntary active euthanasia in a 
report titled ‘Euthanasia and the Artificial Preservation of Life.’72  
The draft Bill ‘To regulate end of life decisions and to provide for matters incidental thereto’73 
provides for three different legal options in respect of the practice of voluntary active euthanasia. The 
options can be summarised as follows: 
Option 1 – No legislation is enacted. This would mean that there simply needs to be a confirmation of 
the current legal position in respect of euthanasia in that the practice is considered to be unlawful and 
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instead, those who are suffering from terminal illnesses should instead receive palliative care until 
their natural death.74 
Option 2 – If a patient requests that a doctor assist him or her in ending his or her suffering by either 
providing or administering some form of lethal substance which will result in the patient’s death, the 
medical practitioner should assist the patient as requested provided certain requirements are met:75  
‘(a) the patient is suffering from a terminal or intractable and unbearable illness; 
(b) the patient is over the age of 18 years and mentally competent; 
 
(c) the patient has been adequately informed in regard to the illness from which he or she is 
suffering, the prognosis of his or her condition and of any treatment or care that may be 
available; 
 
(d) the request of the patient is based on a free and considered decision;  
 
(e) the request has been repeated without self-contradiction by the patient on two separate 
occasions at least seven days apart, the last of which is no more that 72 hours before the 
medical practitioner gives effect to the request; 
 
(f) the patient, or a person acting on the patient's behalf in accordance with subsection (6), has 
signed a completed certificate of request asking the medical practitioner to assist the patient to 
end the patient's life; 
 
(g) the medical practitioner has witnessed the patient's signature on the certificate of request 
or that of the person who signed on behalf of the patient; 
 
(h) an interpreter fluent in the language used by the patient is present in order to facilitate 
communication when decisions regarding the treatment of the patient are made where the 
medical practitioner as contemplated in this section does not share or understand the first 
language of the patient; 
 
(i) ending the life of the patient or assisting the patient to end his or her life is the only way 
for the patient to be released from his or her suffering.’ 
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The legislation further requires that an independent medical practitioner should also be consulted 
before a request can be given effect to.76 The draft legislation provides further that only a medical 
practitioner can carry out the request in question.77 One of the requirements listed above that must be 
fulfilled in order for a request to die to be affected is that the patient must sign a certificate of request 
which is a document signed by the patient requesting that a medical practitioner assist them to die.78 
The draft legislation acknowledges that a patient may change his or her mind with regard to 
requesting death and in such an instance where a patient changes his or her mind, the certificate of 
request shall be destroyed by the medical practitioner.79 The whole of s 7 in fact, provides for the right 
of a patient to rescind his or her request after he or she has made it. This is one of the safeguards that 
protect patients as the request must be entirely voluntary and the patient is at liberty to rescind that 
request should he or she change his or her mind about the request to die.  
 
Option 3 - This option provides for the establishment of a panel or committee which would either 
grant or refuse a request for assistance to die made by a patient. The committee consists of the 
following members:   
a) two medical practitioners other than the practitioner attending to the 
patient; 
b) one lawyer; 
c) one member sharing the home language of the patient; 
d) one member from the multi-disciplinary team; and 
e) one family member.80 
The committee will decide whether a request will be granted, provided that they are satisfied that the 
request is made voluntarily and with proper consideration, the patient is in fact terminally ill and that 
the only way they can be released from their suffering is through euthanasia.81 Such a decision must 
be made by the committee within 3 weeks of the date on which the request for euthanasia is received 
by the committee.82 Following the granting of a euthanasia request, the committee must report to the 
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Director-General of Health with particulars of the patient, medical practitioner carrying out the 
request, place, date and reasons for the request as well as particulars of the members of the committee 
involved in the granting of the request.83 The draft bill further includes provisions relating to the 
advance directives but this falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 
It is submitted that option one listed above unnecessarily infringes on a patient’s right to die with 
dignity and to be able to make choices regarding their own bodies. The provisions listed under option 
two of the draft legislation, however, are prudent and well drafted. It is, however, submitted that the 
legislation should also provide for mature minors to be able to request death and to have such a 
request granted, as is provided for in the Belgian and Dutch legislation. In such an instance, the 
child’s mental capacity and competence to make an end of life decision would need to be assessed. 
This is certainly a conceivable assessment given that the legislation requires that a person be mentally 
competent in any event in order to have their request for euthanasia granted. The legislation should 
further include additional safeguards in respect of children. This should include assessment by a child 
psychologist in order to ensure that the child is competent to make the decision and understands the 
decision he or she is making. Furthermore, a child under the age of 18 who requests euthanasia should 
also require parental consent in line with the provisions of the Belgian Euthanasia legislation. This is 
because it is generally accepted that a parent is in a good position to understand their child’s 
condition. Consent should be given by either the parents or guardians of the child and if the child does 
not have parents or guardians, such a child should be permitted to attain consent from the High Court 
in lieu of parental consent.  
In all instances, it is of utmost importance that the patient’s condition and alternatives be explained to 
him or her in his or her home language in a manner that he or she can understand. This may mean the 
assistance of an interpreter and in all instances it is necessary that measures are taken to ensure that 
the patient is fully aware of his or her condition and the alternatives available to him or her so that the 
decision made by the patient is a well informed one. It must be restated that euthanasia should always 
be considered a course of last resort and not a decision made on a whim. It should be a well 
considered, voluntary decision which is made in order to end suffering when a patient’s condition is 
considered to be futile. This is why safeguards regulating the practice of euthanasia are of utmost 
importance in order to minimise abuse while at the same time ensuring that those patients who are 
suffering unbearably are permitted to die with dignity, provided they are mentally competent and 
mature to make the decision to die.  
Option three of the Draft Bill in conjunction with the conditions listed in option two is perhaps the 
best way in which abuse can be minimised. This would be in line with the Belgian legislation which 
                                                          





establishes a multidisciplinary team that assesses and grants a request for euthanasia and is arguably 
preferable to the Dutch legislation which merely provides for assessment by physician and a 
consulting independent doctor. A multidisciplinary team, specifically in relation to a request made by 
a child is perhaps a better way of ensuring that the child in question is competent to make the decision 
and that the consent given is valid consent. If the patient is to submit the request to the panel, along 
with supporting information, for instance in the case of a child, proof of parental consent, then the 
panel can decide whether the request is to be granted or not. Given that the committee is comprised of 
a number of individuals chosen for specific reasons, it may minimise abuse of the practice of 




Both the Belgian and Dutch legislation allows for minors to request euthanasia provided that they 
have the capacity to make that decision. The difference between the law in those countries, however, 
is that the Belgian legislation places no age limit on the patient who requests death but instead focuses 
on the decision making capacity of a patient in order to decide whether a request for euthanasia be 
granted or not. The Dutch legislation, on the other hand, provides that only a child over the age of 12 
may request euthanasia and if such a child is between the age of 12 and 16, the child must acquire 
parental consent before the request be granted. The legislation in the Netherlands, like the Belgian 
legislation, additionally provides that the minor must have the maturity and capacity to make the 
decision to die. The legislation proposed by the South African Law Commission in respect of 
allowing voluntary active euthanasia is well drafted and provides for stringent conditions and 
requirements, similar to those in the foreign jurisdictions which must be fulfilled in order for a request 
for euthanasia to be granted. It is submitted that the legislation should provide that a multidisciplinary 
team to grant requests for euthanasia, as suggested in option 3 of the South African Law Commission 
report but that the decision should be granted based on the requirements listed in option 2 being 
sufficiently fulfilled.  
It is submitted, however, that the proposed legislation should be extended to allow for mature minors 
to make use of the practice as well. In order to minimise abuse in respect of children, additional 
safeguards should be included in the legislation to ensure that minors are adequately protected. 
Recommendations in this regard will be discussed in the final chapter. It is submitted that a child 
psychologist should assess a child prior to the granting of a request for euthanasia in order to ensure 
that the child is sufficiently competent and mature to make the decision to die. In addition, as is 





or her parents in order for the request for euthanasia to be granted. The Dutch legislation places strong 
emphasis on the need for discussion to be conducted with family members before the decision in 
question is taken, specifically in child cases. This approach should also be considered in respect of 
South African law and perhaps doctors should ensure that a patient has consulted with family 
members prior to making the decision. The fact that since the extension of the Belgian legislation to 
include children in the right to request death there has only been one child to make use of the 
legislation shows that in fact the cases in which a child may request death are very few. The decision 
to die with dignity, however, is such a colossal one, that children should not be ignored in legislation 






CHAPTER SIX: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 Summary of research 
 
The recent case of Stransham-Ford1 has reopened the euthanasia debate in South Africa. The decision 
of the court a quo is currently being appealed in the Supreme Court of Appeal.2 It is likely that the 
case will ultimately be heard in the Constitutional Court where the right to die will finally be decided 
upon judicially. The euthanasia debate is a highly controversial and uncomfortable one but it is 
something that needs careful consideration. If a terminally ill patient does constitutionally have the 
right to choose to die, then the need for legislation has to be contemplated as it is not possible for 
every individual suffering to approach a court. This dissertation intended to confront the even more 
uncomfortable question of a mature minor’s right to die. The Constitution provides that in all matters 
the best interests of the child are of paramount importance and it is with this background that the 
question of death must be considered. Ultimately, the goal of the research was to show that it can 
never be in a child’s best interests to force a terminally ill child to suffer against their will until death 
if they are sufficiently mature to make the decision to die.  
South African law permits passive euthanasia and where for instance, a patient is on a ventilator, the 
doctor will remove the ventilator to bring about death if there appears to be no prospect of recovery 
and in many cases, family members will recommend this.3 The difference between active and passive 
euthanasia, however, is essentially an artificial one given that in both instances the intention and 
outcome is the same and often active euthanasia actually shortens suffering before death as opposed to 
passive euthanasia where a patient may still continue to suffer for quite some time until death 
naturally occurs. Making reference specifically to the elements of intention and causation which must 
both be present to be successful in a prosecution of murder, it was shown in chapter two that these 
elements are both present in respect of passive euthanasia and therefore the distinction between active 
and passive euthanasia is ultimately a superficial one. What must be borne in mind is that if the 
intention of the doctor in causing death is to protect the Constitutional rights of a patient and to 
honour their request, then the method of bringing about death – either through active or passive 
euthanasia – should be irrelevant. The goal of chapter two was also to show that consent to death 
could be a valid defense to wrongfulness because such consent does not encroach on public policy but 
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instead allows for the rights of a terminally ill patient to be recognized. Of course competence to 
consent is always necessary and this is why it would only be in a case where a minor is mature 
enough to understand their decision that he or she would be permitted to consent to death.  
Common arguments in opposition to euthanasia were considered and easily discredited in the 
penultimate stage of chapter two to show that such arguments do not negate the need to allow 
terminally ill patients the opportunity to die with dignity and further, mature minors who understand 
the implications of their decision. Finally, the legal progression in respect of cases considering 
assisted suicide and euthanasia clearly shows the reluctance of our courts to punish acts of euthanasia 
which are seen as ‘mercy killing’ to ease the suffering of the patient.4 This approach of leniency can 
be seen to an extent as a shift in the way in which the courts view euthanasia in that it is an 
acknowledgement that a person should not be severely punished when they are merely acting on the 
request of a terminally ill patient to end suffering. The most recent case on the matter, the case of 
Stransham-Ford,5 confirms that a terminally ill patient may rely on his constitutional rights to dignity, 
privacy and freedom and security of the person for an order allowing for physician assisted suicide to 
be granted. Nevertheless, this case is only persuasive in nature. Not every individual is like Mr 
Stransham-Ford and has the opportunity to approach court for an order and therefore the need for 
legislation is of paramount importance.  
Chapters three and four considered the rights-based research problem in detail, with specific reference 
to children and their rights. Through an in-depth analysis of bioethical principles and human rights, it 
was shown that such rights should in a constitutional dispensation such as ours, be upheld and 
protected. This applies in respect of minors as well. Of course when dealing with the rights of minors 
to make decisions, specifically a decision as important as the decision to die, there are many factors to 
be considered. Chapter four showed that a variety of other legislation such as the Children’s Act and 
the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act allow for a child to consent to procedures which affect 
their own body namely treatment, surgery and abortion. This shows an acknowledgement by the 
legislature of a child’s right to make decisions about their own body. In terms of the Children’s Act, 
the child must be sufficiently mature to understand the procedure they are consenting to which shows 
the legislature’s reluctance to curb a child’s right to autonomy in respect of matter affecting their own 
bodies. The aim of this chapter was to show that it is both possible and practical to establish the 
competence and maturity of a minor to make the decision to die and that consequently such a child’s 
right to dignity and bodily integrity should be promoted by allowing such a child to request death. The 
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intention behind this chapter was also to show that a child’s right to autonomy should be given due 
consideration. Ultimately, the best interests of the child are of paramount importance and the goal of 
this research is to show that it cannot be in a terminally ill child’s best interests to be forced to suffer 
until natural death, provided of course that the child is sufficiently competent to make the decision to 
die.  
The penultimate chapter of this dissertation assessed the legislation in Belgium and the Netherlands in 
order to show how euthanasia allowing children to consent to death can in fact be well drafted and 
effective. The fact that since the 2014 amendment to the Belgian legislation to allow for minors to 
request euthanasia, only one child thus far has made use of the legislation shows that in fact it is 
unlikely that there will suddenly be a mass of cases where children are euthanized, as feared by the 
general public. In a situation where a child is suffering incredibly and there is no prospect of recovery, 
if that child is sufficiently competent to request death, the child should be permitted to do so – 
legislation saving any children, even if it is a small number, from unnecessary suffering, is necessary 
legislation. Chapter five considered the safeguards employed in the legislation in these foreign 
jurisdictions and further considered the draft bill proposed by the South African Law Commission in 
an attempt to consider how the South African law should be developed in respect of allowing 
euthanasia.6  
6.2 Recommendations  
6.2.1 Introduction 
The case of Stransham-Ford7 has made jurisprudential progress in respect of the issue of euthanasia in 
South Africa but does not go nearly far enough. The case merely means that a person who approaches 
court for an order allowing a physician to assist them to die may be granted such an order and the 
doctor who assists such a patient would not be criminally prosecuted. The problem is that it still 
remains that a person must individually approach court for such an order and it is decided on a case by 
case basis. Not every terminally ill person who wishes to end their life has the resources or 
wherewithal to approach a court, much less a minor who would require assistance to approach a court 
as well. The implementation of legislation is the best way to regulate the practice and can ensure 
minimal abuse by putting in place strict safeguards. This dissertation has advocated throughout for the 
inclusion of mature minors in the legislation. 
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The South African Law Commission proposed in its report, three different options to amend the 
current legal position on euthanasia.8 The third option listed in the Draft Bill, in conjunction with the 
factors and safeguards listed in the second option of the Draft Bill is perhaps the best way forward. 
This would establish a panel or committee that would review the request for euthanasia and would 
then make a decision to grant the request, provided certain conditions, as listed below, are fulfilled. 
The panel or committee should consist of various members including two medical practitioners – one 
of which is the medical practitioner attending to the patient, a lawyer, one member who speaks the 
home language of the patient, a family member and a child psychologist in the case of a child. Of 
course a request for euthanasia should only be granted provided the safeguards and conditions have 




With the implementation of legislation, it is essential that certain safeguards be put in place and 
legislation must include requirements that must be fulfilled in order for a person to make use of the 
legislation. The purpose and intention behind euthanasia is mercy killing and allowing a patient 
autonomy and freedom of choice. Although terminally ill patients may be considered vulnerable 
groups, and even more so in the case of terminally ill minors, safeguards in the legislation minimize 
abuse. Unfortunately, there are already cases of euthanasia happening unlawfully. With the 
promulgation of legislation, there is more chance of the strict guidelines and rules being followed in 
order that people are being euthanized at their legitimate request. Having stringent safeguards and 
conditions will reduce the chance of abuse.  The below conditions act as safeguards to try and 
minimize abuse of the terminally ill while still recognizing their right to freedom of choice.  
i) The type of illness 
The patient must be suffering from a terminal illness or disease and suffering from unbearable pain as 
a result. This dissertation has only considered physical ailments and illnesses and maintains that only 
illnesses of a physical nature should be considered to have fulfilled the requirement of illness in terms 
of the legislation. This is something that can be assessed by the doctor and must be confirmed by at 
least one other independent doctor. 
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ii) Confirmation by an independent doctor 
The diagnosis and prognosis in (i) above must be confirmed and verified by an independent doctor 
before a request can be granted. In addition, it is only a qualified medical practitioner that can (a) 
diagnose the patient in (i) above and (b) carry out the request for euthanasia if it is granted. 
iii) Mental competency 
In order for a person to make the decision to die, they must be mentally competent to make the 
decision. This means that a person suffering from a mental illness would be unable to have a request 
for euthanasia granted as he or she cannot be considered mentally competent. The preceding chapters 
have shown that, provided a child is sufficiently competent to request euthanasia, the request should 
also be granted. A child would therefore need to be assessed for mental competency in the same way 
an adult would be assessed. This means that very young and immature children would be completely 
excluded from legislation and would not be able to request death. It is recommended that, especially 
in the case of a child patient, it should be a requirement that the child be assessed for competency and 
maturity by a qualified child psychologist who can correctly ascertain whether the child understands 
the implications of his or her decision to die.  
iv) Parental or guardian consent 
If a patient is under the age of 18, the patient must obtain the consent of their parent or guardian in 
order for the request to be granted. S 129 of the Children’s Act provides only for parental assistance in 
respect of the decision to undergo surgery.10 It is preferable in terms of euthanasia legislation, 
however, that parental consent be required as opposed to just assistance. Parental consent is a more 
onerous burden than assistance but given that the decision to die is the most important decision a 
person can make, it seems necessary that parents actually consent to the death not just assist. If a 
parent refuses to consent, a child would need to approach court and the court would need to make an 
order to the effect that the child is sufficiently competent to make the decision and that the parent’s 
lack of consent could be overridden. Similarly, if a child does not have living parents or his or her 
parents cannot be traced and the child does not have a guardian, then the child can approach the High 
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Court for an order to the effect that the child can request euthanasia notwithstanding the lack of 
parental consent.  
v) Full knowledge of condition, alternatives and manner of death 
The patient must be informed fully by the medical practitioner of his or her condition. This includes 
the diagnosis and the prognosis. The medical practitioner must also discuss all alternatives with the 
patient: This could involve palliative care, sedation or other treatment options. One of the key 
components of consent is that the person consenting must have full knowledge of what they are 
consenting to. This means that it is also imperative that the manner in which the patient will die is 
explained to him or her. For instance, if the chosen method of death is the administration of a lethal 
injection, the doctor must explain the process involved and how death will finally occur.  
vi) The decision is given freely and voluntarily 
In respect of any legal matter, consent is only valid when it is given freely and voluntarily. The same 
applies to consent to death. It is essential that the consent given is given without coercion of any kind. 
It is especially necessary in respect of minors to establish that the child in question has in fact made 
the decision themselves and has not been influenced or coerced by parents of family members. This is 
also why it is recommended that a child psychologist should be involved in the process in order to 
ensure that the child does in fact want to die.  
vii) Counseling 
The decision to die is the most difficult and important decision that a person can make. It would 
therefore be prudent for legislation to include a provision stating that a person should be counseled 
before their request for euthanasia can be granted. This would operate in much the same way as 
counseling is a prerequisite in relation to virginity testing for children.11 During this counseling, it 
would need to be suggested that the patient discuss their decision to die with their family, although 
this cannot be forced. The purpose of the counseling is to establish that the patient fully understands 
what he or she is consenting to and to ensure that the patient is of sound mind and is not merely 
depressed.  
viii) Repeated request to die 
The request to be euthanized must be repeated a number of times. There must be a period of at least 
one week between the requests. It is recommended that there must be two oral requests and at least 
                                                          





one formal, written request. This written request will be in the form of a certificate asking the doctor 
for assistance to die. The signature of the patient needs to have been witnessed by the medical 
practitioner in order for the certificate to take effect. The final request must be made not more than 72 
hours before the medical practitioner gives effect to the request to die.  
ix) Rescission of request 
The patient can at any point leading up to the execution of the request, rescind the request. The patient 
would simply need to tell the attendant medical practitioner that he or she no longer wants to be 
euthanized. In such an instance, the certificate of request must be destroyed by the medical 
practitioner. This does not prevent the patient from later requesting euthanasia again but then the same 
criteria and time periods above must be fulfilled again.  
x) Language 
In all matters leading up to and including the request and decision by the patient to die, it is essential 
that the patient understands the medical practitioner. It is therefore necessary that there be an 
interpreter in a case where the medical practitioner does not speak the same language as the patient. In 
respect of children, it is essential that the medical practitioner explains things to the patient in an age 
appropriate, simple manner so that the child understands their condition, the alternatives and has full 
knowledge of what he or she is consenting to.  
xi) Euthanasia is the only way to end suffering 
Euthanasia should always be seen as a course of last resort, specifically in the case of minors. 
However, it must be accepted that there are instances where a minor suffers unbearable pain and the 
only manner of ending that suffering is through euthanasia. It must be acknowledged that palliative 
care can only go so far in relieving suffering and that there comes a point where pain cannot be 
relieved effectively.  In such an instance where a child then requests euthanasia and fulfills all the 
conditions listed above, and euthanasia is the only method of relieving the child of his or her 
suffering, such a request should be granted. 
xii) Development of guidelines for practitioners 
Should legislation be promulgated allowing for terminally ill patients to make the decision to die, it 
would be prudent for the Health Professions Council of South Africa to develop guidelines for 
practitioners in respect of the practice. It would be wise to include the type of drugs that can and 





law is that the type of drugs to bring about death are not stipulated.12 Perhaps it would be better to 
include this type of information in the ethical guidelines for medical practitioners as this is strictly a 
medical issue which legislators may not have the expertise to decide upon. 
xiii) Establishment of a review committee and real chance of prosecution 
One of the essential aspects of legislation is that there must be some form of sanction attached to it 
should the conditions of the legislation be transgressed. The Dutch and Belgian legislation establishes 
review committees and South African legislation should also include a similar structure. This body 
would be responsible for reviewing any instances where it appears as if there has been malpractice 
and will hand the case over for prosecution if it appears that the doctor has acted criminally. The 
committee who grants the request for euthanasia would need to report every instance of a euthanasia 
request granted to the review committee as the review committee would also have the function of 
collecting data for statistical purposes.  
It is essential that should there be transgressions of the legislation the perpetrators will be criminally 
punished. The history of case law in respect of assisted suicide and euthanasia, as shown in chapter 
two, typically shows reluctance by the courts to hand down hefty sentences for people who assist 
others to die if it is seen as mercy killing. With the implementation of legislation, this attitude would 
change given that a patient would then be permitted to legally request euthanasia. In instances where 
the correct procedure is not followed, the courts would need to hand down harsh sentences to the 
perpetrators.  
 
6.3 Final remarks 
 
The intention of this research was to consider the issue of mature minors requesting their own death in 
light of the call for euthanasia legislation to be promulgated in South Africa. It cannot be disputed that 
children enjoy the right to dignity, bodily integrity and privacy in the same way as adults do. It is 
understandable that in many legal matters rigid age limits must be set if nothing else, for convenience 
sake. This is a different issue, however, and one which requires serious consideration. This is a unique 
issue because it revolves around the choice and right to die but it is because this issue is so unique and 
the decision so important, that it becomes absolutely essential to consider the position of terminally ill 
mature minors when considering legislation. 
                                                          





The case of Stransham-Ford showed that a person can in fact rely on his or her constitutional rights to 
obtain an order that allows one to acquire assistance to die and in such an instance the medical 
practitioner would not be held criminally liable. However, this case only opens the discussion on 
euthanasia to the extent that the need for legislation is being reconsidered and this is why it is 
essential at this time that the position of mature minors also be considered.  
This research only went as far as to consider the position of those who are suffering from a physical 
illness or disease which is terminal in nature and did not consider mental illness. This is perhaps a 
debate for a further dissertation in which it needs to be decided whether mental illness can be 
considered a terminal illness and included in euthanasia legislation. There are various other conditions 
which many may consider to be worthy of ‘mercy killing’ but this is something which needs further 
research and discussion in the medical, jurisprudential and legal fields and which falls outside the 
scope of this dissertation. 
Ultimately, it should always be the aim of legislators to promote the rights of the terminally ill, 
especially in the case of minors. When considering the best interests of the child principle, in 
conjunction with the rights enjoyed by minors in terms of the Constitution, it is submitted that it does 
more harm than good, and is not in the best interests of a terminally ill mature minor to force that 
minor to suffer unbearable pain until death and to infringe upon that minor’s rights to dignity, bodily 
integrity and privacy.   
Olly’s situation is not a unique one.13 Many children suffer from terminal illnesses and suffer 
unbearable pain until death. If legislation were to be promulgated, Olly’s situation could be vastly 
different. Provided he is assessed to be sufficiently mature to understand the implications of his 
decision and that all the above mentioned conditions are also fulfilled, for instance he is able to get 
parental consent, then Olly should be permitted to die a dignified death. It can never be in Olly’s best 
interests to be forced to suffer unbearable pain until his natural death occurs. The law has a duty to 
protect and promote human rights, including and especially, those of children. Instead of denying Olly 
the right to die with dignity, his right to autonomy and to make a choice about his own body should be 
permitted. The right to dignity is not a right that should ever be limited, as it is a right which ‘requires 
us to acknowledge the value and worth of all individuals as members of society.’14 To not promote 
and protect Olly’s rights is to not acknowledge him as a human being worthy of dignity. 
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